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Rethinking Visitation

Introduction
Visitation with children is an issue that has occupied the public and legal
limelight for several decades. Despite the enormous interest evoked by this
issue and the extensive concern with this right, dissatisfaction with existing
legal rules and confusion on this issue have only intensified. In this article, I
argue that the perplexity surrounding this issue reflects the absence of an
underlying theory of visitation that would specify the interests and values
that a right to visitation should aim to protect. I further argue that the current
perception of visitation rights as parental rights and the attempts to resolve
the dilemmas prompted by visitation within a parental rights context thwart
the development of a theory of visitation. I propose an alternative perspective
on these dilemmas that challenges the fundamental premise of visitation as a
parental right and as an integral component of the rights cluster associated
with parental status. Instead, I submit an understanding of the right to
visitation as independent of the cluster of rights associated with parental
status and based on relational values.
In rejecting the understanding of visitation rights as parental rights, I do not
follow the child advocates’ view of visitation rights as children’s rights.1
Rather, my framework of analysis conceives of visitation rights as (or at least
also as) adults’ rights. Nevertheless, I argue that the law’s distinction between

1

See e.g., James G. Dwyer, The Relationship Rights of Children (2006).
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different adult claimants based on their parental status (or lack thereof) is
flawed. My proposal seeks to redirect the law concerning adults’ claims to
enjoy relationships with children toward a legal model based on relational
interests and on the needs of both children and adults.
The first part of the article deals with the current view of visitation as a
parental right and with the implications of this perception. I describe the
legal rules based on this approach, which distinguish between claimants of
visitation rights on grounds of parental status or lack thereof. I then address
the growing critique of traditional visitation rules in the wake of extensive
changes in family structure and their effect on the meaningful relationships
that children form with adults, whether or not they are legally recognized as
their parents. Following this analysis, I examine the legislative and judicial
reactions to this critique and the deep confusion that plagues this area of law,
which culminated in the Troxel v. Granville decision of the Supreme Court.2
I will argue that the current confusion concerning visitation can be
attributed to the existence of two separate and conflicting notions of visitation
appearing in case law, in legislation, and in jurisprudence. The first and more
overt emphasizes the relational values underlying this right, which enable
children and adults to maintain significant relationships. The second and
more implicit embodies remnants of the perception of children as their
parents’ property, extolling the institution of marriage and the nuclear family
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530 U.S. 57 (2000).
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as the preferred model. The co-existence of these two conflicting subtexts
within visitation jurisprudence, I argue, thwarts the development of a
visitation theory and perpetuates turmoil in this legal domain. I further
demonstrate that the understanding of visitation as a parental right, which
marginalizes the nurture and care of children and disregards their relational
interests, is incompatible with a relational understating of visitation. Only by
detaching visitation from the cluster of rights, privileges (and responsibilities)
comprised in parental status can we begin to construe it as a relational right
and develop a coherent visitation theory.
Detaching visitation from the bundle of rights associated with
parenthood will transform not only the right to visitation but legal
parenthood itself, strengthening the tie between child rearing and rights
considered parental. Note that, although my proposal seeks to detach one
element from the cluster of rights associated with parenthood, it does not
pave the way for the unbundling of legal parenthood. I recognize the
significance of parental status and also acknowledge that, at least partly, this
significance stems from the exclusiveness of this status. An additional
advantage of my proposal, then, is that it enables the preservation of parental
exclusivity while recognizing the visitation rights of both parents and nonparents.
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1. Visitation as a Parental Right
The right to visitation is generally perceived as a parental right, part of the
cluster of rights associated with parental status. This understanding is mainly
evident in two basic principles of visitation rules. First, visitation rights are
considered to arise from the very fact of parenthood, so that parents are
entitled to this right simply by being legally recognized as parents. Second,
visitation rights are subject to the general rule of parental exclusivity,
whereby only a child’s legal parents have rights considered parental, rights
that non-parents cannot acquire.3 Thus, whereas parents are usually entitled
to visitation, non-parents are not.

A. Parental Visitation Rights
Parents' rights to visitation are considered natural, inherent, and arising from
the very fact of parenthood.4 The parental right of visitation is considered,
absent custody, to protect the parents’ interest in the companionship of their
children.5 Parental visitation rights are strong and granted as a matter of

3

Katharine T. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive Status: The Need for

Legal Alternatives When the Premise of the Nuclear Family Has Failed, 70 Va. L. Rev. 879,
883 (1984). For current exceptions to this general rule, see infra notes 31-38 and
accompanying text.
4

See, e.g., In re Marriage of L.R., 559 N.E.2d 779, 789 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990); Chandler v.

Bishop, 702 A.2d 813, 817 (N.H. 1997).
5

The right of parents to the companionship and custody of their children was

acknowledged by the Supreme Court in, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
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entitlement, so that courts are usually reluctant to deny them or even restrict
them.6
Ostensibly, parents’ visitation rights are subject to the best interest of the
child standard, but this is not an accurate description of the law as presently
applied.7 Visitation rights are granted to parents even when the parent
making the request has never lived with the child or never demonstrated any
willingness or even any desire to have custody of the child.8 Most courts are
averse to deny visitation to legally recognized parents, even in cases of
abusive parents, where supervised visitation seems sufficient to guard the
child against serious danger.9 Even where a child expresses unwillingness to

For the weight and importance that is attributed to this right see, e.g., Santosky v.
Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
6

See e.g. In re Marriage of Diehl, 221 Ill. App. 3d 410, 429 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991).
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James G. Dwyer, A Taxonomy of Children’s Existing Rights in State Decision Making

About Their Relationships, 11 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 845 932-933 (2003). The best
interest of the child standard does play some role in determining the amount and
particular form of visitation. But here as well, the presumption in most jurisdictions
is that non-custodial parents should receive “standard visitation”—understood as
weekend-long stays every other week, one overnight every week, and a couple of
weeks in the summer—absent a showing that this is likely to significantly harm the
child. Id. at 938. .
8

Karen Czapanskiy, Grandparents, Parents and Grandchildren: Actualizing

Interdependency in Law, 26 Conn. L. Rev. 1315, 1369 (1994); Dwyer, supra note 7, at 934.
9

Leigh Goodmark, From Property to Personhood: What the Legal System Should Do

for Children in Family Violence Cases, 102 W. Va. L. Rev. 237, 271 (1999); Dwyer, supra
note 7, at 936. This interpretation certainly stretches the best interest of the child
standard to its outer limits.
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spend time with the parent, courts will generally refuse to deny or suspend
parents’ visitation, which are routinely ordered over children’s objection.10
Indeed, a parent will be denied visitation rights only under exceptional and
rare circumstances, usually when there is a clear showing of physical or
emotional danger to the child.11
Some scholars have even suggested that parental visitation rights are
constitutionally protected.12 So far, no Supreme Court case has appeared to
recognize visitation as a fundamental interest of non-custodial parents,
entitled to substantial due process. Nevertheless, several decisions seem to
have recognized the interests of non-custodial parents in having a
relationship with their children as a liberty interest sufficient to warrant

10

Cynthia E. Cordle, Note: Open Adoption: The Need for Legislative Action, 2 Va. J.

Soc. Pol’y & L. 275 295-296 (1995). See also: Michael J. Lewinski, Note: Visitation
Beyond the Traditional Limitations, 60 Ind. L. J. 191, 198 (1984); Dwyer, supra note 7, at
936-937. Cases of children expressly opposing visitation involve mostly older
children, and the issues they raise are thus different from the ones I discuss in this
article. Nevertheless, I found it worthy to mention these cases to exemplify the
strength of parental visitation rights. Practically, older children can usually avoid
spending time with a non-custodial parent by not complying with court orders.
Usually, courts would not cut off child support or use extreme measures such as
ordering police enforcement of visitation orders, although children have
occasionally been jailed to coerce them to visit the non-custodial parent. Dwyer, id
at 937.
11

24A Am. Jur. 2d Divorce and Separation § 973; Uniform Marriage and Divorce

Act § 407.
12

See e.g., Steven L. Novinson, Post-Divorce Visitation: Untying the Triangular Knot,

1983 U. Ill. L. Rev. 121, 124-139.

7

Rethinking Visitation

application of procedural due process doctrine.13 Federal and state courts
have occasionally interpreted these Supreme Court rulings as suggesting that
parental visitation rights are constitutionally protected.14 Other courts,
however, have declined to recognize constitutional protection of parental
visitation rights.
While the constitutionality of parents’ visitation rights is still undecided,
the strength of parental visitation rights is unquestionable.15 For my purposes,

13

See e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982). In Santosky, the Supreme Court

struck down a New York law that terminated parental rights if the state proved by a
“fair preponderance of the evidence” that the child was permanently neglected. The
Court held that a parent’s right to raise his or her child could be terminated only
upon “clear and convincing” proof that the child was neglected. Santosky 455 U.S. at
769. The Santosky Court declared that “[e]ven when blood relationships are
strained, parents retain a vital interest in preventing the irretrievable destruction of
their family life.” Santosky 455 U.S. at 753. Thus, the interests of parents in visiting
and communication with their children after temporarily losing custody were
acknowledged by the Court as important enough to entitle the parent to procedural
protections mandated by the Due Process Clause. In Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S.
545, 550 (1965) the Court held that failure to give a non-custodial parent notice of an
adoption proceeding “violated the most rudimentary demands of due process of
law.” The Court thus recognized the interest of a divorced non-custodial father in the
preservation of his visitation rights as a “liberty interest” sufficient to warrant
application of procedural due process doctrine.
14

See e.g., Franz v. United States, 707 F.2d 582 (D.C. Cir. 1983); In re C.J., 729 A. 2d

89, 94 (Pa. Super. 1999); Hoversten v. Superior Court, 74 Cal. App. 4th 636, 641 (1999);
In re Julie M., 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 354, 358 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999); McAlister v. Shaver, 633 So.
2d 494, 496 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App., 1994).
15

Some scholars have criticized the one-sided nature of parents’ visitation rights,

namely, that the visitation rights of parents that courts and legislators seem so eager
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doubts over the constitutionality of parental visitation rights attest that these
rights represent an exception in the cluster of rights associated with
parenthood. Visitation provides the only means enabling a non-custodial
parent to maintain a relationship with the child so that, in essence, denying
visitation is tantamount to terminating the parental rights of the non-custodial
parent. Nevertheless, the constitutionality of parents’ visitation rights remains
debatable, unlike other parental rights associated with custody whose
constitutionality has long been recognized.

B. The Traditional View: Denying Visitation Rights to Non-Parents
Since visitation is considered part of the cluster of rights associated with
parenthood, non-parents have usually been barred from claiming visitation
rights. Contrary to the almost absolute right of parents to visitation, the
interests of non-parents in an opportunity to develop or maintain a
relationship with children have not traditionally enjoyed, absent special
circumstances, legal recognition or protection. The law has created a stark
to protect, are not reciprocal. See e.g., Karen Czapanskiy, Volunteers and Draftees:
The Struggle for Parental Equality, 38 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1415 (1991). Currently, a child
does not have a legal right of visitation with her parents. Courts have refused to
recognize such a right and rejected claims to compel visitation. See e.g., Louden v.
Olpin, 118 Cal. App. 3d 565, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1055 (1981); Dana v. Dana, 789 P.2d
726, 730 (Utah App. 1990); In re Joshua M., 274 Cal. Rptr. 222 (1990). Courts have also
denied children’s claim for compensation for emotional damage allegedly resulting
from the lack of parental companionship. See e.g., Burnette v. Wahl 588 P.2d 1105
(Or., 1978).
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dichotomy between “parents” and “non-parents,” and parenthood has
generally been considered an exclusive status in that only a child’s legal
parents could claim rights with respect to the child.16 More recently, as I
discuss in more detail in another section, some exceptions have emerged to
the complete exclusivity of parenthood.17 Nevertheless, and barring special
statutory provisions, non-parents are not held to have any rights to visitation,
constitutional or otherwise.
When non-parents seek to protect their interests in a relationship with a
child by making a claim for visitation, they often encounter the countervailing
(constitutional) rights of parents. The United States constitution has long been
construed to protect the parents’ exclusive authority to make childrearing
decisions,18 including the right to decide with whom their children shall
associate.19 Legally, non-parents are often considered “outsiders” who
threaten the parent-child relationship. Non-parents may be characterized as
“third parties” and even “strangers” to a child, especially when the legal

16

Bartlett, supra note 3.

17

See infra note 30 and accompanying text.

18

See e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S.

510 (1925); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205
(1972).
19

The paradigmatic example is, of course, Troxel v. Granville 530 US 57 (2000). For

a detailed discussion of Troxel see infra notes 44-53 and accompanying text.
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system assesses their request for visitation.20 This understanding involves
implications for their visitation claims as well because, under the constitution,
a right to privacy is recognized in families and in the parent-child
relationship, giving them a private realm that cannot be entered.21 The
constitution, then, has also been interpreted as providing shelter to the
parent-child relationship by creating a boundary that protects parents and
their children from outside interference.22

20

Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg: A Child-Centered Perspective on

Parents’ Rights, 14 Cardozo L. Rev. 1747, 1786 n. 150 (1993). The terms “third party”
or “stranger” denote disconnection, detachment, and even a threat. In reality,
however, many of those referred to as “third parties” and “strangers” are hardly
detached from the child’s life. Thus, for instance, the term “strangers" was used to
describe grandparents. Id. and a surrogate mother. Janet L. Dolgin, Just a Gene:
Judicial Assumptions About Parenthood, 40 UCLA L. Rev. 637, 684-685 (1993). On these
grounds, I have chosen to use the term “non parents.”
21

See e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944); Griswold v. Connecticut,

381 U.S. 479 (1965).
22

Prior to Troxel, several state courts found that third party visitations violated

family privacy. See e.g. Hawk v. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d 573 (Tenn. 1993). The plurality’s
decision in Troxel, however, was not founded on the parents’ or the family’s right to
privacy but on the parental autonomy to make childrearing decisions. See infra
notes 47-49 and accompanying text. Jennifer Nedelsky is critical of the notion of
legal rights as boundaries and of this understanding of the right to privacy in
particular. According to Nedelsky, this view depicts the self as bounded and fosters
independence and selfishness rather than interdependence and connectedness.
Jennifer Nedelsky, Law, Boundaries, and the Bounded Self, 30 Representations 162
(1990). Nedelsky’s critique, however, does not fully take into account the role of
rights as boundaries around groups and, particularly, intimate groups such as the
family. Ferdinand Schoeman, for example, argues that boundaries protecting
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2. Challenging Traditional Visitation Rules
The last decades of the twentieth century witnessed growing unease with
traditional legal conceptions of family and parenthood, including traditional
visitation laws. The main reason for the current discontent with existing laws
has been the changing reality of the American family, partly due to changes in
social norms: the high rate of divorce, the growing numbers of blended (or
“step”) families and of single-parent families, the increase in the proportion of
children born outside of marriage, and the emergence of new gay and lesbian
families.23 In addition, advancements in medical technology have radically

relationships from intrusion are essential for the very possibility of intimate
relationships. Boundaries, according to Schoeman, enable and foster the creation of a
safe environment enabling individuals to expose and share their selves with each
other. In his view, the notion of intimacy provides the basis for according the family
a right to privacy. Ferdinand Schoeman, Rights of Children, Rights of Parents, and the
Moral Basis of the Family, 91 Ethics 6, 14-15 (1980). Elsewhere, I criticize the notion of
rights as establishing boundaries, even around the family. Ayelet Blecher-Prigat,
Rights, Boundaries, and the Family, 27 Tel-Aviv U. L. Rev. 539 (2003) [Hebrew].
23

Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 64 (U.S. 2000). These variant family patterns are

grouped under the category of “nontraditional” families. This term, however, is
misleading, for it is used to describe all family patterns that depart from the model
of the nuclear family, although they have in fact existed throughout human history.
Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, “It All Depends on What You Mean by Home”: Toward a
Communitarian Theory of the ”Nontraditional Family”, 1996 Utah L. Rev. 569, 570.
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expanded the range of procreative possibilities, undermining traditional
conceptions of procreation and parenthood.24
This confluence of changing social norms and advancement in
reproductive technologies has had a tremendous effect on the family
relationships between children and adults. An ever increasing number of
children began to form strong and meaningful attachments with adults who
are not legally recognized as their parents, and these relationships have
challenged the legal system in a multitude of ways.25 With visitation defined
as a parental right and parenthood as exclusive, these relationships between
children and non-parental adults have been denied recognition and
protection under the law. Stepparents, partners of legal parents,
grandparents, surrogate mothers, foster-parents—all have sought and
generally failed to protect their interest in continuing their relationships with
children by claiming visitation rights.26 Their stories exemplified the ever-

24

In particular artificial insemination and in vitro fertilization. See, e.g., Marsha

Garrison, Law Making for Baby Making: An Interpretive Approach to the Determination of
Legal Parentage, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 835, 837-842 (2000).
25

Bartlett, supra note 3.

26

See e.g. Cox v. Williams, 502 N.W.2d 128, 131 (Wisc. 1993) (holding that a former

stepparent did not have standing to petition for visitation); Pierce v. Pierce, 645 P.2d
1353 (Mont. 1982); Worrell v. Elkhart County Office of Families & Children, 704 N.E.2d
1027, 1028 (Ind. 1998) (former foster parents lacked standing to seek visitation with
former foster child); In re Melissa M., 421 N.Y.S.2d 300, 304 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1979)
(former foster parents denied visitation rights after child was returned to biological
father and stepmother); In re Corey Richardson, 53 Va. Cir. 128, 132 (2000); Swiss v.
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increasing disjunction between the new reality of people’s lives and the
dominant legal norms, and have captured public as well as academic
attention.27
When legal rules cease to relate to people’s actual lives, their justification
is significantly undermined, hence the extensive criticism of family law in
general and of existing visitation laws in particular.28 The law’s failure to
protect the meaningful relationships shared by children and adults and its
seeming disregard for their respective relational interests have yielded
various proposals for its modification. In all fifty states, legislative and

Cabinet for Families & Children, 43 S.W.3d 796 (Ky. Ct. App. 2001); Alison D. v.
Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27, 29 (N.Y. 1991) (lesbian co-mother denied visitation after
the relationship with the biological mother had ended); Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d
776, 782-83 (Cal. 1993) (denying legal rights for relationship with a child from a
surrogate mother after deciding that legally, she was not the child’s mother).
27

The literature on these questions is particularly extensive. See, e.g., Bartlett,

supra note 3; Alison Harvison Young, Reconceiving the Family: Challenging the Paradigm
of the Exclusive Family, 6 Am. U. J. Gender & Law 505 (1998); Dwyer, supra note 7;
Kimberly P. Carr, Alison D. v. Virginia M.: Neglecting the Best Interest of the Child in a
Nontraditional Family, 58 Brooklyn L. Rev. 1021 (1992); Craig W. Christensen, Legal
Ordering of Family Values: The Case of Gay and Lesbian Families, 18 Cardozo L. Rev. 1299
(1997); Gilbert G. Holmes, The Tie that Binds: The Constitutional Right of Children to
Maintain Relationships with Parent-Like Individuals, 53 Md. L. Rev. 358 (1994); Alexa E.
King, Solomon Revisited: Assigning Parenthood in the Context of Collaborative
Reproduction, 5 UCLA Women’s L.J. 329 (1995); Matthew M. Kavanagh, Rewriting the
Legal Family: Beyond Exclusivity to a Care-Based Standard, 16 Yale J.L. & Feminism 83
(2004).
28

Id.
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judicial initiatives have attempted to adapt the law to “the changing realities
of the American family.”29
The main change adopted in the various reforms has been the erosion of
parental exclusivity concerning visitation and the recognition of visitation
rights for various non-parents. This move has generated an intensive debate,
which is still ongoing: How to reconcile parental authority on child-rearing
decisions with the associational interests of both children and adults and with
the best interest of the child standard? What place is there for parental
exclusivity in the changing reality of family life? Whose interest in access to
the child should be legally recognized and protected? What should be the
basis for recognizing individuals’ visitation rights? These and various other
dilemmas remain unresolved. In the following sections, I review the legal
reforms and the legal chaos surrounding visitation issues that culminated in
Troxel v. Granville and its aftermath, suggesting that the turmoil and the
impasse on the visitation issue can be attributed to the lack of an underlying
theory of visitation.

3. The Visitation Debate
A. The Disarray in Third-Party Visitation Statutes
Recognizing the changes affecting the American family, the legal system
began to deviate from parental exclusivity on the issue of visitation and to

29

Troxel v. Granville, 530 US 57, 64 (2000).
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acknowledge relationships between children and non-parents, inter alia, by
enacting various third-party visitation statutes. Like most matters of family
law, visitation issues are subject to state discretion, and all states have indeed
recognized some form of third party visitation.30 The common denominator of
all the different statutes is the perception of visitation as a parental right.
When recognized, visitation by non-parents is regarded as the exception.
Except for this feature, however, the visitation statutes and the case law
concerning non-parents are “dazzlingly varied,” and even a cursory review of
them is sufficient to reveal vast inconsistencies and confusion.31
States diverge significantly as to who may be entitled to visitation rights.
Although every state has enacted legislation according some visitation rights
to grandparents, the circumstances under which visitation would be granted
differ significantly from state to state.32 Only about one-third of the states

30

See e.g., Troxel, 530 U.S. at 73, n.1.

31

John DeWitt Gregory, Family Privacy and the Custody and Visitation Rights of Adult

Outsiders, 36 Fam. L.Q. 163, 168 (2002); Developments in the Law: IV. Changing Realities
of Parenthood: The Law’s Response to the Evolving American Family and Emerging
Reproductive Technologies, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 2052, 2054 (2003) [hereinafter Changing
Realities of Parenthood]
32

Michael E. Ratner, Note: In the Aftermath of Troxel v. Granville: Is Mediation the

Answer?, 39 Fam. Ct. Rev. 454, 455 (2001); Anne Marie Jackson, The Coming of Age of
Grandparent Visitation Rights, 43 Am. U. L. Rev. 563, 569 (1994); Christopher M.
Bikus, Note, One Step Forward, Two Steps Back, 75 Neb. L. Rev. 288, 293 (1996); John
Dewitt Gregory, Blood Ties: a Rationale for Child Visitation by Legal Strangers, 55 Wash.
& Lee L. Rev. 351, 369-371 (1998); Michael Quintal, Note, Court-ordered Families: an
Overview of Grandparent-visitation Statutes, 29 Suffolk U.L. Rev. 835 (1995).
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provide for visitation by stepparents in their legislation, either expressly or in
language that is broad enough to include them,33 and state courts addressing
visitation rights of stepparents have arrived at different conclusions.34 The
uncertainty and lack of consistency intensify with regard to other interested
parties, such as foster parents, siblings, uncles, and cousins. Such interested
parties have rarely been accorded visitation rights in states’ legislation, and
the courts have varied widely on whether they should be.35
State laws, however, differ not only on who may seek visitation, but also
regarding the circumstances in which visitation rights should be granted to
non-parents and on the substantive standards that should govern the

33

Gregory, supra note 31, at 361.

34

Compare Finck v. O’Toole, 880 P.2d 624 (Ariz. 1994) (en banc) (stepparents lack

standing to seek visitation) with Hickenbottom v. Hickenbottom, 477 N.W.2d 8 (Neb.
1991) (court could award visitation to stepparent), and Rhinehart v. Nowlin, 805 O.2d
88 (N.M. Ct. App. 1990) (court could award visitation to stepparent). See also
Gregory, supra note 31, at 360-367; Diane L. Abraham, California’s Stepparent Visitation
Statute, 7 S. Cal. Rev. L. & Women’s Stud. 125 (1997).
35

Lewinski, supra note 10, at 195. For state differences concerning foster parents,

see, e.g.: Gregory supra note 31, at 367-369. Regarding siblings visitation, compare
State ex rel. Noonan v. Noonan, 547 N.Y.S.2d 525 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989) (half-siblings
have standing to seek visitation) with Ken R. v Arthur Z., 682 A.2d 1267 (Pa. 1996)
(half-siblings lack standing to seek visitation). Regarding aunts, uncles, and cousins,
compare Youmans v. Ramos, 711 N.E.2D 165 (mass. 1999) (aunt has standing to obtain
visitation) and MacDonald v. Quaglia, 658 A.2d 1343 (Pa. Super Ct. 1995) (cousin has
standing to seek and was granted visitation); with In re Katrina E., 636 N.E.2d 53
(N.Y. App. Div. 1996) (aunt and uncle have no standing to sue for visitation).
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decision.36 To give but a few examples: states differ on whether or not a
disruption in family relations in the form of death or divorce is a precondition
for awarding visitation to non-parents, or whether other requirements, such
as mediation, should also be met prior to such a decision.37 Visitation laws are
indeed as varied as the different jurisdictions, and the prevalent confusion is
also evident in the frequent changes in third-party visitation laws in various
states.38
Differences in third-party visitations laws between states are not
intrinsically problematic and do not constitute a violation of "integrity,” in

36

Russell M. Coombs, Child Custody and Visitation by Non-Parents Under the New

Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act: A Rerun of Seize-and-Run ,16 J.
Am. Acad. Matrimonial Law 1, 13-14 (1999).
37

Most states do condition non-parents visitation on a prior disruption of family

life and are reluctant to award visitation over objection of parents in intact nuclear
families. See e.g. Gregory, supra note 31, at 168. For states awarding grandparents
visitation in cases of dissolution of the relationship between the child’s parents, or in
cases of death of a parent or parents of the child, see e.g. Mass. Gen. Laws Ch. 119,
39D (2000); Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-1802(1)(a) (1998); Minn. Stat. 257C.08 (2002); Nev. Rev.
Stat. 125C.050(1)(2001); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 3109.11 (West Supp. 2003); 23 Pa. Cons.
Stat. Ann. 5311 (West 2001).
38

Coombs, supra note 36, at 14. See also Patricia S. Fernandez, The Status of

Grandparents’ Visitation Rights in Massachusetts, 40 Boston B.J. 6 (1996) (stating that the
grandparent visitation statute in Massachusetts was amended a number of times
between 1972 and 1996); Weathers v. Compton, 723 So. 2d 1284 (Ala. Ct. Civ, App.
1998) (summarizing frequent amendments of Alabama’s grandparent visitation law).
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Dworkin’s terms.39 Family matters always involve conflicting interests and
policy considerations. Whenever children are concerned, emotions also tend
to run high. Varied political and social forces have also influenced state
legislation on visitation.40 With so many interests, policy considerations, and
emotions at play, and with intuitions pointing in conflicting directions, it is
not surprising that people disagree on what the law should be and only
plausible, and even inevitable, that different states should have developed
different non-parents’ visitation regimes.
My critique, then, does not target the variance in visitation rules for nonparents, although this fact alone can cause great uncertainty to family
members.41 My objection is to the lack of any principle or theory underlying
the current variations of visitation laws among states. Statutes and case law
on this issue were triggered by the rapidly changing social reality and by the
pressures exerted by various political groups. Instead of developing these
39

“Integrity holds within political communities, not among them… The American

Constitution provides a federal system: it recognizes states as distinct political
communities and assigns them sovereignty over many issues of principle. So there is
no violation of political integrity in the fact that the tort laws of some states differ
from those of others even over matters of principle.” Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire
185-186 (1986).
40

Third party visitation statutes, and particularly statutes awarding visitation

rights to grandparents , were pushed by powerful lobbies, including the AARP
(formerly known as the American Association of Retired Persons). Janet L. Dolgin,
The Constitution as Family Arbiter: A Moral in the Mess?, 102 Colum L. Rev. 337, 372
(2002).
41

See e.g., Coombs, supra note 36, at 13-17.
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changes on solid theoretical grounds stating the nature of visitation rights, the
values that should underlie them, and how to reconcile these rights with
parental authority, they seem erratic, ad hoc responses to perceived
injustices.42 Hence, they fail to offer a calculated and coherent scheme that
could serve as a basis for alternative jurisprudence. This disarray is evident in
Troxel v. Granville,43 the 2000 Supreme Court ruling that addressed the
constitutionality of third party visitation statutes.

B. Troxel v. Granville and Its Aftermath
The extent to which third party visitation statutes infringe the constitutional
rights of parents to make child rearing decisions has long been a contested
issue.44 Although supreme courts in various states reached mixed rulings on
this question during the 1990s,45 the Supreme Court had denied review of
cases involving third-party visitation prior to granting certiorari in Troxel.46

42

The confusion and absence of a coherent and principled jurisprudence are

evident not only on visitation issues but on family matters in general. See Dolgin,
supra note 40.
43

530 U.S. 57 (2000).

44

Changing Realities of Parenthood, supra note 31, at 2056.

45

Compare Beagle v. Beagle, 678 So.2d 1271 (Fla. 1996); Herbst v. Sayre, 971 P.2d 395

(Okla. 1998); Hawk v. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d 573 (Tenn. 1993) and Brooks v. Parkerson, 454
S.E.2d 769 (Ga. 1995) with King v. King, 828 S.W.2d 630 (Ky. 1992) and Herndon v.
Tuhey, 857 S.W.2d 203 (Mo. 1993); .
46

See e.g. King v. King, 828 S.W.2d 630 (Ky. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 941 (1992);

H.F. v. T.F., 483 N.W.2d 803 (Wis. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 953 (1992).
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The Court’s decision to hear Troxel, therefore, generated expectations that the
ruling would clarify some of the concerns pertaining to this issue. These
expectations, however, were to be disappointed.
The statute under consideration at Troxel was a law permitting “any
person” to petition for visitation rights “at any time,” whenever such
visitation was seen to be in the child’s best interest.47 Acting under this statute,
a family court judge ordered the broadening of visitation rights granted to
paternal grandparents, contrary to the wishes of the children’s mother.
There was no opinion for the Court in this case. The Court was deeply
split and issued six separate opinions. Judges disagreed about whether the
case should have been considered at all and, if so, whether it should have
been considered as a facial or an as-applied challenge; about the scope, if any,
of the proper constitutional protection accorded to parental rights; about
whose interests should have been considered, and about various additional
matters.48 Justice O’Connor’s plurality opinion (for four judges only)
digressed to fact-specific grounds and concluded that, on the facts of the case,

47

Wash. Rev. Code § 26.10.160(3) (2000), cited Troxel, 530 U.S. at 60.

48

Martin Guggenheim, however, contends that “the Court was in considerably

more substantive agreement on the basic constitutional issues concerning third-party
visitation statutes than is apparent from the number of opinions filed and the
inability of any one opinion to capture a majority of views.” Martin Guggenheim, The
Making of the Model Third-Party (Non-Parental) Contact Statute: The Reporter's
Perspective, 18 J. Am. Acad. Matrimonial Law. 15, 20 (2002).
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the Washington family court had failed to show adequate deference for the
mother’s decision.49
The lack of a majority, the multiplicity of opinions, and the confusion
characterizing each one of them have provided fertile ground for diverse and
even contradictory interpretations of Troxel. Indeed, non-parental visitation
cases attempting to follow the Troxel precedent are mixed and confused.
Courts in different states have interpreted Troxel differently and even within
states, variant understandings of Troxel have led to contradictory rulings as to
the constitutionality of their states’ statutes.50 Troxel has also proven a rich
vein for the extensive academic attempts seeking to discern its meaning and
implications.51 Not surprisingly, these scholarly analyses also offer
contradictory readings of the case and of the various judicial opinions.52 In

49

Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer joined Justice

O’Connor’s plurality opinion. Troxel, 530 U.S.,at 60 (2000).
50

See e.g., Dolgin, supra note 40, at 396 – 401 (reviewing conflicting cases from

New York and California); Kristine L. Roberts, State Supreme Court Applications of
Troxel v. Granville and the Courts’ Reluctance to Declare Grandparent Visitation Statutes
Unconstitutional, 41 Fam. Ct. Rev. 14 (2003) (reviewing post-Troxel case law from
different states, including Maine, West Virginia, Mississippi, Kansas, Iowa, and
Oklahoma); Dwyer, supra note 7, at 977 – 984.
51

A recent Lexis search found 870 references to Troxel in the US & Canadian Law

Reviews, Combined database, of which at least 202 seem to undertake an in-depth
analysis of the case (addressing it at least ten times in their text).
52

Compare, e.g., Dwyer, supra note 7, at 978, interpreting the case as clearly

having “put the breaks on the trend toward expansion of third-party visitation,”
with Changing Realities of Parenthood, supra note 31, at 2057-2058, interpreting Troxel
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many respects, Troxel seems to have triggered only further doubts regarding
non-parents’ visitation issues.53 The confusion exposed in Troxel is
exacerbated by the perplexity surrounding the meaning of legal parenthood.

C. The Malleability of Parental Status
The swift and extensive changes in family patterns and norms over the last
decades have significantly challenged traditional conceptions of parenthood.
Thus far, current law has failed to keep up with changing social norms and
bio-technological changes and has not produced clear and stable new
principles according to which legal parenthood could be determined.
Questions about motherhood and fatherhood in cases of surrogacy, sperm
donation, same-sex families, children born out of wedlock, and other family
situations are still occupying legislators and judges.54 This situation involves
significant implications for visitation issues. Since visitation is considered a
parental right, deciding whether a claimant for visitation is a parent and thus
prima facie entitled to visitation or a non-parent and thus generally not

as implicitly endorsing non-parents’ visitation rights: “By leaving in place only a
hazy presumption that parents act in the best interests of their children, the plurality
has allowed plenty of room for states to grant [visitation] rights to nonparents.”
53

For an in-depth analysis of Troxel see Dolgin, supra note 40.

54

See e.g., Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993); Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491

U.S. 110 (1989); Thomas S. v. Robin Y., 599 N.Y.S. 2d 377 (Fam. Ct. 1993), rev’d, 618
N.Y.S.2d 356 (App. Div. 1994); Rubano v. DiCenzo, 759 A.2d 959 (R.I. 2000); Elisa B. v.
Super. Ct., 117 P.3d 660 (Cal. 2005); V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539 (N.J. 2000).
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entitled to this right, is an important issue. Given that legal parenthood is
fluid, open, and indeterminate, however, discerning parents claimants from
claimants who are non-parents is at times a complicated task.
Besides the negative implications for legal predictability involved in this
situation, the indeterminacy of legal parenthood broadens and distorts the
scope of visitation issues. Claimants for visitation, and particularly in nontraditional family situations, are encouraged to state their claim as one of
visitation by parents, thus requiring consideration of their parental legal
status. Two telling, highly publicized examples are the Supreme Court case
of Quilloin v. Walcott55 and the New York case of Thomas S. v. Robin Y.56
The common features of these different cases concern a biological male
progenitor who maintained an ongoing relationship with the child, but
neither initiated nor showed interest in initiating legal proceedings to be
recognized as the child’s legal father. After the relationship had continued for
several years, access to the child was denied by the mother, who was the legal
parent.57 Only when access to the child was denied (in both cases when the
child was approximately twelve years old) and the men had to seek enforced
access through rights of visitation, did they initiate proceedings to be legally

55

434 U.S. 246 (1978).

56

599 N.Y.S. 2d 377 (Fam. Ct. 1993), rev’d, 618 N.Y.S.2d 356 (App. Div. 1994).

57

In Thomas S., the child lived with two lesbian mothers, and both were opposed

to the child’s continued contact with Thomas. Under the law, however, only the
biological mother was considered a legal parent authorized to make decisions as to
who should be allowed to associate with the child.
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recognized as the children’s respective fathers so as to secure parental
visitation rights.58 In Thomas S. in particular, it was evident that Thomas’ sole
concern was to continue his relationship with the child, Ry. Since the
claimants’ prospects of being awarded visitation rights as non-parents were
almost non-existent, they had to take their chances on a paternity claim,
which is far broader and substantially different.59 Disputes over visitation
thus become distorted into battles about who the child’s parents really are
and slide into demands for parental rights in toto, including custody, thereby
muddling significant questions. Instead of considering whether the nature of
the relationship between the claimant and the child justifies awarding
visitation rights, and the potential implications of awarding visitation rights
for the child’s relationship with her custodians, the courts enter a debate
about a different and larger issue: what makes one a parent.60

58

In Quiloin, the mother’s husband wanted to adopt the child and the couple

found that contact with Quilloin was disruptive. See infra notes 100-104 and
accompanying text. In Thomas S. access to the child was denied following a
deterioration of the relationship between Thomas and the child’s two lesbian
mothers.
59

Indeed, once his status as father was not recognized by the Supreme Court,

Quilloin’s claim for visitation was succinctly denied. So was the claim of Thomas S.,
according to the New York family court’s decision that was reversed on appeal.
Another example often cited, which broadens and distorts the dispute, is Michael H.
v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989).See infra notes 109-113 and accompanying text.
60

Whereas in Quilloin the child explicitly stated a wish to continue visitations

with Quilloin, in Thomas S., the child expressed anxiety about continued visitations.
As noted, both children were approximately twelve years old and thus of an age
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Another consequence of the confused meanings of legal parenthood is
that it is subject to manipulation. Legal parenthood can easily be interpreted
in ways that fit a desired outcome, including but not limited to visitation
issues. A claimant adjudged to be worthy of visitation can be legally
recognized as a parent and vice-versa, parental status can be denied to block
visitation. Visitation, then, is not only derivative from prior recognition of a
legal parent but also a factor in determining it.61 The New York family court
decision in Thomas S. again provides an example. Judge Kaufmann denied
Thomas’s paternity claim because he found that compulsory visitation
between him and the child, Ry, would be harmful to the child by
undermining her relationship with her two mothers and her sister and the

where their wishes should be considered. Once Quilloin was denied paternal status,
however, the almost automatic result was the denial of visitation. The visitation
question was not considered per se. Thomas S., on the other hand, was eventually
recognized as the legal father, and although the appellate court stated that visitation
was to be considered separately, it was obvious that a paternity determination also
determined that visitation would take place. Thomas S., however, stopped the
contest at this point and did not pursue his visitation rights. Susan Dominus,
Growing Up With Mom & Mom, N.Y. Times, October 24, 2004, 6 (magazine) at 69 (an
interview with the child, Ry, at the age of 22).
61

The idea of rights considered parental is that legal parenthood is a given and

that all rights, duties, and obligations considered parental follow and are simply
attached to the legal parent. For a critique of this idea, see infra notes 98, 147 and
accompanying text.
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stability of her family unit.62 Although these concerns may have been real and
may have justified denying Thomas rights of visitation, they are (or should
be) unrelated to the question of paternal status. This was indeed the point
asserted by the appellate court, which reversed the decision and held that the
benefit or harm to Ry as a result of Thomas’s visitation was irrelevant to his
paternity claim. These considerations, the appellate court held, could and

62

Legally, Ry had no sister and only one (biological) mother. Judge Kaufmann’s

decision was at first indeed celebrated in lesbian circles for recognizing nonbiological ties in lesbian families, adopting a functional approach to legal
parenthood and family. The functional approach to family law was developed by
various theorists as a response to the traditional or formal approach, which defines
familial relationships in accordance with the nuclear family model. The formal
approach generally “recognizes only individuals related to each other by the bonds
of blood, adoption, or marriage.” Note: Looking for Family Resemblance: The Limits of the
Functional Approach to the Legal Definition of Family, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 1640, 1645 (1991)
In contrast, the functional approach asks what group of people functions as a family,
that is, what group of people shares the essential characteristics of a family. See e.g.
Martha L. Minow, Redefining Families: Who’s In and Who’s Out?, 62 U. Col. L. Rev. 269,
272 (1991). In so doing, the functional approach attempts to bridge the gap between
law and reality, namely, between the formal legal definitions of familial relations
(such as parenthood) and the reality of people’s lives. But misgivings have been
raised as to whether the functional approach really achieves what it attempts to do.
See e.g., Brad Sears, Winning Arguments/Losing Themselves: The (Dys)Functional
Approach in Thomas S. v. Robin Y., 29 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 559 (1994); Craig W.
Christensen, Legal Ordering of Family Values: The Case of Gay and Lesbian Families, 18
Cardozo L. Rev. 1299 (1997).
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should be addressed under the best interest of the child standard when
considering Thomas’s request for visitation (as a father).63
The argument of the appellate court stating that the potential impact of
Thomas’s visitation was irrelevant to his paternity claim is in principle
correct. Courts are indeed required to determine visitation with parents
guided by the best interest of the child. But parents’ rights of visitation, as
noted, are firm and denied only under extreme circumstances.64 Under
current law, then, denying visitation rights to protect a child from potential
harm to her and her family requires us to negate the claimant’s paternity.65
The malleability of legal parenthood, then, together with the prevalent
understanding of visitation as a parental right, open the way for the improper
conflation of questions concerning visitation and questions concerning legal
parenthood.66 The move toward recognition of third party visitation was
supposed to alleviate the improper conflation of issues, as it enables claimants

63

Thomas S. v. Robin Y., 618 N.Y.S.2d 356, 362 (App. Div. 1994).

64

Supra notes 7-11 and accompanying text.

65

Karen Czapanskiy, Interdependencies, Families, and Children, 39 Santa Clara L.

Rev. 957 1008 (1999).
66

As in Quilloin and in Michael H., denying paternity in these cases was also

meant to enable another man to assume the role of legal parent through adoption or
the presumption of paternity, not only to block visitation. The malleability of legal
parenthood, however, again enabled the Court to reach the desired outcome. The
focus tends to be on the family rather than on the individual child, especially if the
case concerns a traditional nuclear model. See infra notes 98-117 and accompanying
text.
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to make a claim for visitation without being recognized as parents.67
Nonetheless, and especially following Troxel, visitation by non-parents is still
an exception whereas visitation by parents is the well established rule. As
long as visitation is understood as a parental right, then, questions of
visitation and questions concerning parenthood will remain entangled.
This is also evident in the use of such notions as de facto parentage,
psychological parenting, or functional parenthood. These notions were
developed in response to the changing reality of parenthood and child-adult
familial relationship, and they enable to confer rights considered parental
upon individuals who are not legally recognized as parents. As these notions
suggest, although these individual claimants are not legally recognized as
parents, they should have been. Janet Dolgin offers recent examples of state
courts using concepts such as de facto parentage or psychological parentage
to award visitation rights to claimants by distinguishing these cases from
Troxel, which had purportedly addressed the visitation rights of non-parents
who did not function as parents.68 These notions do blur the once clear line
dividing parents from non-parents, but they re-establish the understanding of
visitation as a parental right and its connection to all other rights considered
parental. Thus, individuals recognized as de facto, functional, or
psychological parents can make a claim for all rights considered parental, not

67

Sears, supra note 62, at 575.

68

Dolgin, supra note 40, at 401-404 referring mainly to Rideout v. Riendeau, 761 A.2d

291, 303 (Me. 2000) and Rubano v. DiCenzo, 759 A.2d 959 (R.I. 2000).
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only to visitation. Thus, a visitation claim submitted by a de facto, functional,
or psychological parent can, just like a paternity claim, reopen the way to a
claim for parental rights in toto.69

D. Reformulating the Question as a Way Out of the Maze
The disarray of third party visitation status and the Supreme Court's
confusion in Troxel revealed the absence of an underlying theory of visitation
that would specify the interests and values that a right to visitation should
aim to protect. Furthermore, as long as parental status is the main
distinguishing factor between visitation claimants, the malleability of legal
parenthood and concepts such as de facto parenthood compound the current
confusion about visitation rights, especially by non-parents. It also clouds the
real questions that should be debated concerning these rights, and thus
thwarts the development of a theory of visitation.
On the way to developing such a theory of visitation, however, to take as
given that visitation is a parental right sets it on the wrong track. Rather than
asking why only the parents’ interests in their relationship with their children
should be protected, I wish to challenge the basic assumptions of the existing
laws and ask instead how we should understand rights of visitation and what
should be the basis for recognizing such rights. My answer would be that
visitation should be understood as an independent relational right, rather

69

See infra notes 160-161 and accompanying text.
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than as a parental right, part of the cluster of rights associated with
parenthood.

4. Visitation as a Parental Right: An Inadequate Construct
In light of the central role that children’s interests should play in constructing
legal rules that affect them, I begin my case against the conception of
visitation as a parental right by discussing children’s interests in the issue of
visitation.70 My discussion will show that visitation as a parental right is
incompatible with children’s interests and embodies remnants of a perception

70

Talking about children’s interests to challenge, and even more so to justify,

adults’ rights requires some further consideration. Children’s interests can and often
should be protected through children’s rights as such. Occasionally, however,
adults are granted rights in order to serve children’s interests. Meir Dan-Cohen calls
these derivative rights because they are recognized in A out of concern for B. Meir
Dan-Cohen, Freedoms of Collective Speech: A Theory of Protected Communications by
Organizations, Communities, and the State, 79 Calif. L. Rev. 1229, 1233 (1991).
Recognizing adults’ rights is sometimes a better way of protecting children’s
interests, given that children depend on adults for the exercise of their rights and
thus become subject to abuse and manipulation. Martin Guggenheim, What’s Wrong
with Children’s Rights (2005). Visitation is particularly conducive to the use of a
children’s rights vocabulary to conceal adults’ interests. Emily Buss, Children’s
Associational Rights?: Why Less is More, 11 Wm & Mary Bill of Rts J 1101, 1102 (2003).
Nonetheless, advocates of the view that the interests of adults (and not only those of
children) deserve legal recognition and protection, should be particularly careful
when taking care of adults’ rights, lest they contradict children’s interests. A limited
claim stating that when two alternative legal models of adults’ rights are available,
the one more compatible with children’s interests should be preferred, will suffice
for my current purposes.

31

Rethinking Visitation

construing children as their parents’ property. I further demonstrate that the
perception of visitation as a parental right plays down relational values.

A. Children’s Relational Interests
A good starting point for the argument that the right to visitation as a
parental right is not compatible with, and even contradicts, children’s
interests is the anti-compulsory visitation stance of Joseph Goldstein, Anna
Freud, and Albert Solnit in their renowned work, Beyond the Best Interest of the
Child.71 Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit emphasize the negative side of courtordered visitation over the objection of children’s custodial parents. In their
view, court ordered visitation may expose children to conflicting loyalties,
threatening the intimacy and the relationship with their custodians. These
potentially harmful effects of compulsory visitation mandate that no
visitation rights, of any kind, should be legally recognized, not even the
visitation rights of non-custodial parents.72

71

Joseph Goldstein, Anna Freud & Albert J. Solnit, Beyond the Best Interests of the

Child (2d ed. 1979). [hereinafter Beyond the Best Interests of the Child].
72

Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit addressed only non-custodial parental visitations

following divorce and did not address the visitation rights of non-parents. The
reason is not that they found visitation of non-parents less troubling but rather that
when Beyond the Best Interest of the Child was written, visitation of non-parents was
not yet recognized. Under the prevalent understanding of parental exclusivity, only
non-custodial parents were then awarded visitations. Bartlett, supra note 3.
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Although their proposal for revoking the visitation rights of noncustodial parents encountered fierce opposition, the debate it triggered
provided strong arguments against the notion of visitation as a parental right.
Their critics did not dismiss the claim they raised about the potential harms of
visitation, but emphasized that compulsory visitation still involves
advantages to children, which offset and even exceed its harms. But the
benefits of compulsory visitation noted by the critics exist only when
visitation rights had been meant to secure the continuation of an already
ongoing relationship. If not, the arguments that Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit
raise against compulsory visitation, whether by parents or non-parents,
remain unanswered.
The anti-visitation proposal of Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit relies mainly
on the authors’ psychoanalytic theory of child development.73 Their view

73

It should be noted that the authors’ depiction of their work as scientific has also

been heavily criticized. See e.g., Daniel Katkin, Bruce Bullington & Murray Levine,
Above and Beyond the Best Interest of the Child: An Inquiry into the Relationship Between
Social Science and Social Action, 8 Law & Society Rev. 669 (1974) The thrust of the
argument against the authors was that they had failed to provide empirical basis for
their contentions. Id. See also Martha L. Fineman & Anne Opie, The Uses of Social
Science Data in Legal Policy Making: Custody Determinations and Divorce, 1987 Wis. L.
Rev. 107, 145-146; Robert D. Felner & Stephanie S. Farber, Social Policy for Child
Custody: A Multidisciplinary Framework, 50 Amer. J. Orthopsychiatry 341 (1980);
Michael S. Wald, Thinking About Public Policy Toward Abuse and Neglect of Children: A
Review of Before the Best Interests of the Child, 78 Mich. L. Rev. 645, 664 (1980); Peter L.
Strauss & Joanna B. Strauss, Book Review, 74 Col. L. Rev. 996, 1002 (1974) [reviewing
Beyond the Best Interest of the Child].
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emphasizes children’s need for a continuous and stable relationship with at
least one parent, involving not only continuous physical care but also the
parent’s exercise of absolute authority.74 According to their theory, any
disruption or interference in the child’s relationship with the parents is
detrimental because it undermines stability and the child’s view of the parent
as “omniscient and all powerful.”75 Court-ordered visitation by a person who
is unwanted by the custodial parent falls under their definition of a
disruption, from which the parent-child relationship should be shielded.
These authors argue that a visitation the custodial parent considers
undesirable may expose the child to conflicting loyalties, compromise the
intimacy between the child and the custodial parent, and shatter the child’s
required trust in the parent’s autonomy and omnipotence when exercising
control over the child’s life.76 They emphasize that children’s need for stability

74

The question of how to identify this parent or establish parental status is less

significant for my endeavor. Hence, I will not address Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit’s
proposal, which seeks to replace the traditional standards of marriage and biology
for determinining legal parenthood with psychological standards and with their
concept of the psychological parent. Beyond the Best Interest of the Child, supra note 71,
at 98. Instead, my focus will be on the alleged implications of the child’s need for a
steady relationship with a parent, regardless of how the parent’s identity is
determined legally.
75

Joseph Goldstein, Anna Freud & Albert J. Solnit, Before the Best Interests of the

Child 9 (1979) [hereinafter Before the Best Interests of the Child].
76

Beyond the Best Interest of the Child, supra note 71, at 37-38.
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is particularly acute following a crisis experience in the family relations, such
as divorce, which may leave children ”shaken, disoriented and confused.”77
Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit further contend that the threat that
compulsory visitation poses to the child’s relationship with her custodian is in
no way offset by any of visitation’s potential benefits, due to the limited
nature of the relationship that a child can form with an individual who is
merely visiting.78 They have also argued that facilitating children’s positive
relationships with two people in conflict with one another is beyond the
courts’ capacity.79
Their strong arguments against compulsory visitation were subject to
heavy criticism in academic circles. Critics did not question these scholars’
arguments on the potential harms of compulsory visitation and did recognize
that visitation is not an unalloyed blessing. They did note, however, that the
arguments of Goldstein and his colleagues had overstated the damage of

77

Id. at 117-118. The authors qualify their argument to children below the age of

five or six at the time of parents’ separation: “Once a child is past the age of five or
six, he may be unwilling to give up the relationship to a parent who has played a
large part in his early development. By that time he has outgrown his earlier
unquestioning trust in parents, he has learned to criticize, to take sides in quarrels, to
begin to understand that parents in some way share responsibility for the separation.
In short, the progress in his cognitive capacity may help him with his emotional
difficulties inherent in the situation.” Id. at 119 note*.
78

Beyond the Best Interest of the Child, supra note 71, at 38.

79

Id. at 117.
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compulsory visitation and played down the potential harm of its denial.80 In
highlighting the harms of denying visitation, many of their critics have relied
on Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit’s own recognition of the importance of
continuity of relationships in children’s lives.81 Studies on divorce, foster care,
adoption, and cross-cultural perspectives suggest that children are not only
dependent on a network of attachments rather than on a primary single bond,
but also point out the significance of continuity and the harmful effect of loss
in the various relationships in children’s lives.
Studies of families after divorce demonstrate that maintaining ties with
non-custodial parents through visitation is highly significant for children.82

80

See e.g., Wald, supra note 73.

81

See e.g., Michael Freeman, The Best Interests of the Child? Is The Best Interests of the

Child in the Best Interests of Children?, 11 Int. J. of Law, Policy and the Family 360, 380
(1997).
82

The research most often cited in countering Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit’s

argument against post-divorce visitation is probably the long-term study conducted
by clinical psychologist Judith Wallerstein and her associates, tracking the effects of
divorce on children. Judith S. Wallerstein & Joan Berlin Kelly, Surviving the Breakup:
How Children and Parents Cope with Divorce (1980) [hereinafter Surviving the Breakup];
Judith S. Wallerstein & Sandra Blakeslee, Second Chances: Men, Women, and Children a
Decade After Divorce (1989) [hereinafter Second Chances]; Judith S. Wallerstein &
Sandra Blakeslee, The Good Marriage: How and Why Love Lasts (1995). In Surviving the
Breakup, Judith Wallerstein together with Joan Kelly analyzed and reported the
effects of divorce on the lives of sixty divorced couples and their children, both at the
time of marital breakup and at subsequent intervals of eighteen months and five
years. For our purposes, one of their main findings concerned the importance for the
child of a continued relationship with both parents following divorce and the
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Data from foster placement and adoption of older children contexts also
indicates that continued contact with the original parents generally promotes
the child’s sense of well-being and emotional security.83 Cross-cultural
research has expanded the framework of discussion, arguing that children
form multiple attachments to psychological parents and to others who are
members of their kin groups.84 These studies point to the extensive and varied
network of children’s attachments, with any loss argued to be potentially
harmful.
Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit do recognize the importance of continuing
relationships in children’s lives and the potential harm ensuing from breaking
up attachments. Their advice in situations of divorce is to encourage custodial
divorced parents to facilitate visitation between the non-custodial parent and

significance of visitation in this regard. Subsequent studies, however, emphasized
the centrality to children's adjustment following divorce of the custodial parent-child
relationship . Judith S. Wallerstein & Tony J. Tanke, To Move or Not to Move:
Psychological and Legal Considerations in the Relocation of Children Following Divorce, 30
Fam. L.Q. 305, 310-311 (1996).
83

Marsha Garrison, Why Terminate Parental Rights? 35 Stan. L. Rev. 423, 461-463

(1983); David Fanshel, Urging Restraint in Terminating the Rights of Parents of Children
in Foster Care, 12 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 501, 502 (1984).; Fernando Colon,
Family Ties and Child Placement, 17 Fam. Process 289, 290 (1978).
84

See e.g., Carol B. Stack, Who Owns the Child? Divorce and Child Custody Decisions

in Middle-Class Families, 23 Soc. Prob. 505 (1976); Peggy Cooper Davis, The Good
Mother: A New Look at Psychological Parent Theory, 22 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change
347 (1996); Carol B. Stack, Cultural Perspectives on Child Welfare, 12 N.Y.U. Rev. L. &
Soc. Change 539 (1983-84).
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the child. They even suggest that, other things being equal, courts should
award custody to the parent most willing to provide the child opportunities
for contact with the other parent.85 Nevertheless, they argue that children
benefit from multiple ties on condition that the relationships between the
adults involved are positive, or at least not hostile and negative. If the latter,
children not only do not benefit but actually suffer. Hence, they do not
oppose visits in general but only compulsory visits that jeopardize children’s
relationship with their custodians and thus, in their view, entail far greater
harm than that involved in breaking up attachments in children’s lives. 86
Although with reservations, critics of Goldstein and his colleagues do
acknowledge the centrality of the relationship with the custodial parent to the
child’s well-being, as well as the potential harm of visits to which the
custodial parent objects.87 These critics, however, contest that conflicting
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Beyond the Best Interest of the Child, supra note 71, at 118-119. It might also be

desirable, in their view, for courts to add to their (unconditional) custody awards an
appropriate warning, in a paraphrase of the state’s warning to smokers: “Denial of
Visits may be Detrimental to your Child.” Id. at 185, note 8.
86

Their proposal in this regard was often misunderstood. Many of their critics

simply misinterpret Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit as suggesting that children do not
form multiple attachments. Beyond the Best Interest of the Child, supra note 71, at 116118.
87

Wallerstein and her associates note: “[N]early half of the children had

witnessed intensely antagonistic exchange between parents at the time of visiting.”
Surviving the Breakup, supra note 82, at 141 and “[a]ll in all, one-third of the children
were consistently exposed to intense anger at visiting time. The tension generated by
the parents burdened the visits and stressed them and the children.” Id. at 125. The
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loyalties are potentially more harmful than broken attachments. In their view,
by allowing custodial parents to sever meaningful attachments in children’s
lives, Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit misapply the continuity principle they
themselves had formulated.
The debate, therefore, hinges on the balance of harms resulting from
court ordered visitations, when denying visitation means breaking up an
existent attachment. When visitation is sought to enable the claimant to
establish a new relationship with the child and the custodial parent objects,
consensus appears to be that ordering visitation would be more detrimental
to the child. Data on the least detrimental alternative88 to the child is confused
and unreliable: Should we safeguard one unconditional relationship in the
child’s life at the expense of breaking up another attachment? Or should we
preserve the continuity of relationships despite conflicting loyalties and a
potential threat to the child-custodian relationship?89

anxiety that surrounded visits in these cases affected the child’s behavior. Children
“developed symptomatic behavior in response to the anxiety and fear of angering
one or the other parent. They felt that they were in jeopardy between two warring
giants and they reacted accordingly.” Id. at 126.
88

I follow Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit's proposal to use the “least detrimental

alternative” for a child rather than the “best interests of the child” as a reminder of
the limits of what can be attained within the limits of the law. Before the Best Interests
of the Child, supra note 75, at 6.
89

For an in-depth search of this literature, see Ayelet Blecher-Prigat, Toward Relational

Understanding of Visitation 177-217 (2005) (unpublished JSD dissertation, Columbia
Law School). Even in a divorce context, where our strongest intuition suggests that
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Without attempting to resolve this issue, my own interest in surveying
this literature is twofold. First, I use the debate on court-ordered visitation,
and particularly the points of agreement between the two parties, to
demonstrate that provisions in visitation laws should rely on the existence or
absence of a relationship with the child rather than on parental status. Second,
I use the debate to expose the inconsistencies of the legal approach based on
parental status in different contexts, thereby exposing the genuine rationale
that underlies this approach and its inadequacy. My proposal seeks to replace
these policy considerations with relational values.

B. The Inconsistency of the Legal Approach
The debate within the social sciences suggested that, insofar as visitation
rights are to be recognized, their main justification from the perspective of the
children’s interests is to maintain continuity in the children’s relationships.
This rationale, however, is irreconcilable with visitation understood as a
parental right, which generally denies visitation rights to non-parents, even
when visitation is meant to preserve an ongoing relationship with a child. By
contrast, parents are entitled to visitations even without any previous
relationship with the child. This legal distinction, which is based on parental

the child’s “best” and not merely “least detrimental” alternative is to maintain
contact with the noncustodial parent, researchers admit that the question of whether
a relationship with two antagonistic parents or with one overburdened but stable
one remains open. Felner & Farber, supra note 73, at 344.
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status rather than on the existence of a relationship, seems incompatible with
children’s interests.
Furthermore, when visitation laws rely on parental status, the result is
inconsistency and incoherence. In the debate on the advantages of
maintaining multiple albeit conflicting attachments vs. safeguarding one
unconditional attachment for children, the law endorses the former option in
certain contexts and the latter in others. When the claimant for visitation is a
non-parent, the law prefers to maintain one unconditional relationship with
the child, and views legally enforced visitation as an intrusion on the
custodian-child relationship.90 The law rejects this perception of visitation
rights, however, when the claimant is a legally recognized parent. Sustaining
multiple, even if conflictual, attachments in children’s lives is viewed as the
best, not just the least detrimental, alternative when they involve a child’s
parents.91 Yet, social science provides no grounds for a distinction between
parents and non-parents, either as figures with whom visitation disturbs the
custodian-child relationship or as figures with whom a continued relationship
is important to the child.
But the inconsistency evinced in the legal approach goes beyond the
parent/non-parent distinction. Over two decades ago, Marsha Garrison
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This perception of non-parents’ visitation is also evident in Troxel v. Granville,

530 U.S. 57 (2000).
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On the problematic distinction between “parents” and “non-parents,” see

section 3.C. above.
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recognized a further discrepancy92 Garrison compared the widespread legal
acceptance of Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit’s ideas in the contexts of foster care
and adoption with the extremely negative reaction to their ideas in the context
of divorce.93 In the context of long-term foster care and adoption, the legal
system embraced children’s need for an unconditional permanent
relationship and, upon children’s adoption, terminated the original parents’
parental rights, including visitation. In the post-divorce context, however, the
idea of one unconditional permanent relationship was fiercely rejected, and
the legal system endorsed children’s need for the continuity of familial
relationships.94 Children’s presumed legal need for a continuity of
relationships following divorce led not only to strong visitation rights of non-

92
93

Garrison, supra note 83.
Garrison, id at 450-453. See also Peggy C. Davis, “There’s a book Out… “: An

Analysis of Judicial Absorption of Legislative Facts, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 1539 (1987)
(documenting the judiciary’s blanket acceptance of the arguments in Beyond the Best
Interest of the Child in regard to child’s placement disputes).
94

Garrison’s purpose in demonstrating the law’s inconsistency was to bolster her

argument against the termination of parental rights to allow post adoption
visitation. Garrison, supra note 83 at 455. Whereas Garrison sides with Goldstein,
Freud and Solnit’s critics and claims they were wrong, I merely argue that it is
inconsistent to adopt the critics view on visitation with regards to parents while
endorsing Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit’s approach in the context of non-parents’
visitation. Hence, to the extent that the legal system recognizes visitation rights, it
cannot do so on the basis of the claimant’s parental status.
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custodial parents but also to the popularity of joint custody legislation in the
late 1970s and 1980s.95
What makes Garrison’s comparison particularly interesting is that the
situations of post-divorce and of adoption after long-term foster care address
the visitation rights of parents who had lost custody of their children. Garrison
argued that children’s needs in both these contexts are similar, and she
questioned the law’s differential treatment of these situations.96 In the postdivorce situation, children and the parents who lose custody of them retain
contact through visitation rights whereas, following adoption, children lose
contact with their original parents, who are normally denied visitation rights.
In technical-legal terms, the post-divorce situation concerns parents’
visitation while the post-adoption situation concerns non-parents’ visitation,
since the adoption terminated the parental status and rights of the original
parents. But the title of Garrison’s article—“Why Terminate Parental Rights?”
— Vividly pinpoints that legal parenthood is a human creation, and
terminating parental status is a decision rather than a given. Legal decisions
cannot be made by internal deduction from the legal concept of “parent.”
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See Elizabeth Scott & Andre Derdeyn, Rethinking Joint Custody, 45 Ohio St.L.J.

455, 466 (1984). Later experience, however, showed that, contrary to consensual
arrangements, court ordered joint custody is harmful to children’s interests by
exposing them to perpetual conflict. Id. at 487-495. See also: Eleanor E. Maccoby &
Robert H. Mnookin, Dividing the Child: Social and Legal Dilemmas of Custody 284-285
(1992).
96

Garrison supra note 83.
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Garrison’s research highlighted that classifying a claimant for visitation as
parent or non-parent is open and undetermined, all the more so given the
upheaval in the traditional legal definitions of motherhood, fatherhood, and
parenthood in recent decades.97

C. Protecting Marriage and Nuclear Families
Denying visitation to original parents in cases of adoption is justified on the
grounds of not disrupting or undermining the new family created by the
adoption.98 This rationale is endorsed regardless of the adopted children’s
previous attachment to their original parents, and without explaining why a
preference for children maintaining stable and undisturbed relationships is
utterly rejected in situations of divorce. This approach affords a glimpse into
the true motives underlying the legal system’s visitation policy. Visitation
rules, including the general rule of denying the original parents’ visitation
rights upon a child’s adoption, are probably not about protecting the
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Section 3.C. above.
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See e.g.,2 Am. Jur. 2d Adoption §166; Matter of W.E.G., 710 P.2d 410 (Alaska

1985); Marckwardt v. Superior Court, 150 Cal. App. 3d 471, 198 Cal. Rptr. 41 (2d Dist.
1984); People in Interest of M.M., 726 P.2d 1108 (Colo. 1986); Matter of C.O.W., 519 A.2d
711 (D.C. 1987); Sanders v. Sanders, 498 So. 2d 1063 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 5th Dist. 1986);
In re Adoption of Herbst, 217 Kan. 164, 535 P.2d 437 (1975); Jouett v. Rhorer, 339 S.W.2d
865 (Ky. 1960); Matter of C.P., 221 Mont. 180, 717 P.2d 1093 (1986); Matter of Fox, 1977
OK 126, 567 P.2d 985 (Okla. 1977); In re Adoption of Dearing, 572 S.W.2d 929 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1978); In re A.V.D., 62 Wash. App. 562, 815 P.2d 277 (Div. 1 1991); Matter of
Adoption of RDS, 787 P.2d 968 (Wyo. 1990).
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children’s primary relationship with the custodial parents but rather about
preserving the traditional model of the nuclear family and the institution of
marriage. The true justification for denying visitation to original parents in
cases of adoption, then, is to avoid interference with the new (nuclear) family,
viewed as the ideal family pattern, rather than to protect the children’s
interests and their relationships with their custodians.
This rationale can be discerned not only in the inconsistent legal approach
endorsed in post-divorce and post-adoption situations but in other family
situations as well. Thus, for instance, preserving the traditional nuclear family
was at the heart of the Supreme Court decision in Quilloin as well as in other
cases known as the “unwed fathers’ cases,”99 which culminated in the 1989
case of Michael H. v. Gerald D.100 The circumstances of three of theses cases
concerned a child born out of wedlock, whose mother subsequently married a
man who was not the biological father and wanted to adopt the child.101 The
adoption was dependent upon a priori determination that the biological male
progenitor was not the child’s legal father, thus focusing on the paternal
status of biological fathers of children born out of wedlock. Another central

99

In addition to Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978) these cases are: Lehr v.

Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979); Stanley v.
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) and Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
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491 U.S. 110 (1989).
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Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), the first case that began this chain of cases

is an exception. Stanley was not a case of one man against another but a biological
father against the state.
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issue, however, concerned the very continuation of a relationship between the
biological father and the child through legal rights of visitations that, in turn,
also depended on his parental status.102
Recognizing the biological father’s parental status, therefore, could
impede the adoption and hinder the creation of a traditional nuclear family
for the child by enabling the biological father to interfere with its functioning.
These considerations, as noted, affected the determination of parental status
as well as the more limited question of visitation. My critical view of the
confluence of issues in these cases, as well as of the disproportionate influence
of the wish to deny visitation on the determination of denying paternity, was
noted above.103 In three of these cases— Michael H., Lehr, and Quilloin—the
biological father was denied paternal status. A supposedly unavoidable
consequence was a denial of his claim for visitation rights.
Resembling post-adoption situations, denying visitation to the biological
fathers in these cases might be theoretically justified for the purpose of
securing children a stable and unconditional relationship, as Goldstein, Freud,
and Solnit advocated. On closer scrutiny, however, it is obvious that
underlying the legal rules is not a child’s need for one unconditional
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Three of the biological fathers, Quilloin, Caban, and Michael H., did not initiate

paternity proceedings until the pending adoption jeopardized their access to the
child, suggesting they were more interested in the rights to visitation than in the
symbolic parental status.
103

See supra notes 51-64 and accompanying text.
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relationship but rather the wish to protect the family, and not necessarily a
particular family but more a specific ideal—that of the nuclear family. Quilloin
is a telling example.
In Quilloin, the mother’s husband, Walcott, wanted to adopt her son, who
was then approximately twelve years old and had an established relationship
with his biological father.104 Although the child expressed a desire to be
adopted by Walcott, he also clearly indicated that he wished to continue
visitations with Quilloin. The mother, however, argued that “these contacts
were having a disruptive effect on the child and on [the]… entire family.” 105
In denying Quilloin paternal status and affirming the adoption, the Supreme
Court of Georgia also succinctly denied the continuation of Quilloin’s
visitations based on the mother’s claim, and this decision was upheld in the
Supreme Court.106 Although the denial of Quilloin’s rights of visitation was
seemingly meant to protect the child from the visits’ disruptive effect, the son
still expressly indicated he wished them to continue. Obviously, had the
mother and Quilloin been married and divorced before the child’s birth,
Quilloin would have been the legal father and the mother’s claim to deny
visitation could not have been heard. In the typical case of a divorce followed
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Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 251.
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Id.
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Id. Allegedly that was an inevitable result of allowing the adoption. Id. note 11.

However, it was already noted that terminating original parents' rights following a
child's adoption is a decision and not a given. Supra notes 96-97 and accompanying
text.
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by the mother’s remarriage, the potential harm to the children from
incompatible male authority figures, persistent conflictual relationships, or
disrupting the relationship with the custodian could not be considered
grounds for denying visitation 107 Had the mother not remarried, it is also
improbable that the Court would have been receptive to such a claim.
A more explicit instance of denying visitation through denial of paternal
status in order to protect the ideal of the nuclear family is Michael H. v. Gerald
D.108 Michael H. reached the United States Supreme Court after Stanley, Caban,
Quilloin and Lehr—four cases in which the Court had seemed to have
established clear conditions for recognizing an unwed biological progenitor as
a father.109 As in Quilloin, Michael’s immediate concern was to ensure
visitation rights with his daughter and thus protect his relationship with
her.110 The right to visitation thus stood at the heart of the legal proceedings
for paternity. Unlike Quilloin, Michael’s claim seemed quite strong, since he
seemed to satisfy all the conditions set in the precedents for legal recognition
as a father. He had lived with the child, had recognized her as his daughter,
had a close and loving relationship with her, and had clearly demonstrated
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See e.g. Pierce v. Yerkovich, 80 Misc. 2d 613, 622-624 (N.Y. Misc., 1974); Ireland v.

Ireland, 246 Conn. 413, 442-443 (Conn., 1998).
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246 (1978), Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979) and Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248
(1983).
110

At least according to the Court. Michael H. 491 U.S. at 118.
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full commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood—all shown to be key
factors in establishing legal fatherhood in prior cases. The Court nevertheless
denied Michael’s claim for paternal status, knowing that this would end his
attempts to establish visitation.111 The underlying reason was the mother’s
marriage to another man and the Court’s motivation to protect the family
unit, which might be jeopardized were Michael’s claim admitted. In
dismissing Michael’s claim, Justice Scalia explicitly stated that the motivation
behind this decision was to protect the unit “typified by the marital family,”
which in this case consisted of the child, her mother, the mother’s husband
and two other children born to the couple.112
Both Quilloin and Michael H. epitomize the centrality of protecting nuclear
families in visitation laws. 113 Not only did the biological father and the child
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Theoretically, Michael could have sought visitation as a “non-parent.” Section

4601 of the California Civil Code Annotated (West Supp. 1989) provided that “ [i]n
the discretion of the court, reasonable visitation rights may be granted to any other
person having an interest in the welfare of the child.” Michael H. 491 U.S. at 144 (cited
by Justice Stevens concurring). This provision was indeed the basis for Justice
Stevens’ concurring opinion, finding that the California statute had provided
sufficient protection to Michael’s relationship with Victoria. Id at 132-135. As Justice
Brennan noted in his dissent, however, this provision did not provide a real option
for Michael to obtain visitation with Victoria since, as interpreted by the California
courts, a putative parent who cannot establish paternity would not be able to obtain
discretionary visitations as a non-parent. Id. at 148 – 150 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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Michael H. 491 U.S. at 123 n. 3.

113

Though Michael H. is perhaps the most extreme example of how far the Court

will go to protect the nuclear family, the motivation of protecting nuclear families

49

Rethinking Visitation

have an established relationship (in Quilloin for twelve years!), but it was also
argued that continuing the relationship was meaningful for the children as
well (in Michael H. by the guardian ad litem and in Quilloin by the child
himself), but the courts did not view this as sufficiently important.
My argument is not that Quilloin and/or Michael should have been
awarded visitation rights.114 Maintaining relationships with the biological
father might indeed have been harmful to the child in either or both these
cases, through exposure to conflict or disruption of the primary relationship
with the custodial parent, as noted. These are genuine and valid concerns that
the courts could address. What remains unexplained is the complete absence
of these considerations, insofar as the legal system perceives them as valid, in
post-divorce situations. Divorced fathers who had been legally married
would not find their visitation rights denied following the mother’s

underlies all the unwed fathers cases. See Martha Albertson Fineman, The Neutered
Mother, the Sexual Family and Other Twentieth Century Tragedies 85 (1995). The rule that
seemed to emerge from the Court as to the paternal status of unwed biological
fathers allegedly focused on the relationship of the child and the biological father.
The Court stated that a biological father who has established a substantial
relationship with his children is legally a father, but the real focus was on the
relationship between the biological father and the mother and their resemblance to
the marital relationship. Fineman argues that in fact, only when the biological father
had maintained a social relationship with the mother that resembled a traditional
conjugal relationship in a nuclear family was he recognized as a legal father. For a
similar argument, see Dolgin, supra note 20, at 654.
114

Nor do I challenge or endorse the decision that, legally, they are not fathers. My

interest in this article is not in legal parenthood and how it should be determined.
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remarriage were the mother to claim that visitation has a disruptive effect on
the child and on her new family. In fact, mothers who would dare to make
such a claim in the name of the child may find they are accused of alienating
the child from the father and risk losing custody.115 The reason is that
marriage, just like the nuclear family, is a sacred institution whose protection
is an important goal of the law. Hence, marriage guarantees its parties rights
and parental status, which includes strong parental rights such as visitation.
The motivation to preserve the ideal of the nuclear family can account for
other common aspects of visitation rules, which may appear baffling when
examined from the perspective of children’s interests. Thus, for instance, a
non-parent stands a better chance of having standing and being awarded
visitation rights if the child with whom visitation is sought was born out of
wedlock, if the child’s parents are divorced, or if one of the child’s parents has
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See e.g., Ritch v. Ritch, 195 S.W.2d 205 (Tex. Civ. App. San Antonio 1946); Ellis v.

Ellis, 2006 WL 3199289 (Miss.App.,2006); Clark v. Smith, 130 Ohio App.3d 648, 654655, 720 N.E.2d 973 (1998). Martha Fineman has challenged the stereotype of
mothers as vindictive and has called to recognize their misogynous basis: “Most
mothers love their children and would not willfully deprive them of contact with a
caring and responsible father. In fact, if the children are old enough to assert their
own interests, it is unlikely that mothers could deprive them of contact with their
fathers even if they wanted to. By making these observations, I do not mean to
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even common… “ Martha Fineman, Dominant Discourse, Professional Language, and
Legal Change in Child Custody Decisionmaking, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 727, 766 – 767 (1988).
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died.116 When a child is part of an intact nuclear family, the likelihood that a
non-parent will be awarded visitation rights declines significantly.117 This
distinction was endorsed and promoted by Katharine T. Bartlett, one of the
first scholars to advocate recognition of visitation rights to non-parents.118
This distinction between intact nuclear families and other family patterns
cannot be explained by reference to children’s needs—be it the need for a
stable unconditional relationship with the custodial parent, the need for
continued attachment in the children’s lives, or any other relational values.
As for children’s need for uninterrupted relationships with their parents,
the rules resulting from the legal distinction between intact nuclear families
and families that have undergone a crisis are the opposite of the rules we
might expect. Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit claimed that children’s need for
stability is greater following situations of family crisis.119 A child raised in an
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See e.g., Stephen Elmo Averett, Grandparent Visitation Right Statutes, 13 BYU J.
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intact nuclear family is part of a stable set of relationships, and thus seems
subject to a smaller risk from exposure to a conflicting relationship outside the
nuclear family. By contrast, when the child’s relationship with the custodial
parent is already suffering due to death or a break in the family relations,
maintaining a relationship with an individual who is in conflict with the
custodian seems to pose greater risk to the child.120 The legal distinction
between different family patterns remains confusing when considered
according to children’s need for continuity of relationships as well. If this is
the underlying rationale for awarding visitation rights, children’s meaningful
relationships should be protected whether or not they live in a nuclear family.
Here again, however, it seems that what motivates the legal policy is not the
children’s interests but rather upholding nuclear families as the preferred
family pattern. Intact nuclear families are entitled to legal protection from
outsiders, and visitation rights are perceived as interferences.121

120

Beyond the Best Interest of the Child, supra note 71, at 118.
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Troxel v. Granville may seem to rebut the legal distinction between the nuclear

family pattern and others. Indeed, the Supreme Court presented the case as one
involving an attempt to supersede a (single) mother’s decision. Nevertheless, during
the proceedings the mother, Tommie Granville, married Mr. Kelly Wynn, and he
legally adopted the two children, Natalie and Isabelle. The girls, then, had two
legally recognized parents raising them in an ostensibly traditional nuclear family.
Despite the Court’s attempt to play down the significance of this fact, it cannot be
ignored. In fact, Ms. Granville herself believed that her husband’s adoption of the
two girls would undermine the grandparents’ claim (though for different reasons).
In re Visitation of Troxel, 940 P.2d 698, 701 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997).
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D. The Shadow of the “Children as Property” Conception
As noted, the debate within the social sciences suggested that, insofar as
visitation rights are to be recognized, their main justification from the
perspective of the children’s interests is to maintain continuity in the
children’s relationships. Nonetheless, parents are entitled to visitations even
without any previous relationship with the child. The legal distinction based
on parental status, as I have argued, probably implies that visitation rules do
not seek to protect children’s meaningful attachments or their primary
relationships with their custodial parents, and rest instead on other
considerations. 122 My focus so far has been on social considerations, mainly
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The famous case In re Baby M., 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988) provides a telling

example. In Baby M., Mary Beth Whitehead entered into a contract with William
Stern whereby she agreed to be artificially inseminated with Stern’s sperm,
relinquish her parental rights, and deliver the child to Mr. and Mrs. Stern. After the
baby was born, however, Mrs. Whitehead refused to relinquish her parental rights.
The New Jersey Supreme Court determined that Mrs. Whitehead’s parental rights
could not be terminated based on the surrogacy contract alone. Thus, her entitlement
as a mother to the companionship of Melissa was taken as evident. In re Baby M, 537
A.2d at 1236. Being a mother and absent custody of the child, which was awarded to
the father, Mr. Stern, Mrs. Whitehead was entitled to visitation, securing her interest
in a continued relationship with Melissa.. The New Jersey Supreme Court remanded
the case to the lower court to determine Mrs. Whitehead's rights of visitation. On
remand, the Superior Court determined that Melissa’s best interests were served by
“unsupervised, uninterrupted, liberal visitation with her mother.” In re Baby M, 542
A.2d 52, 53 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1988). Note that no argument of harm to Melissa
from breaking up an existing attachment she already had could be adduced to justify
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the preservation of the traditional model of the nuclear family and the
institution of marriage, but other interests also seem to play a key role in
constructing the laws of visitation: the parents’ private interests.123 Protection
of the parents’ private interests also seem to embody remnants of the
notorious conception of children as their parent’s property. Contrary to

this award of visitation. Absent from the court’s decision is also a concern of
possible harm to the relationship Melissa shared with her custodial father. The
courts’ utter disregard for this concern is particularly strange in the circumstances of
surrogacy in general, and in particular those that surrounded the Baby M. case.
Unlike the circumstances that typically surround divorce, Stern and Whitehead had
never chosen to have an intimate relationship, and yet the court imposed a shared
(familial) relationship on them. Not surprisingly, this relationship was characterized
by animosity and high conflict. A 1994 story in Redbook, which featured Baby M. and
Mrs. Whithead’s family, vividly illustrated some of the complications that followed
from this determination. Mrs. Whitehead emphasized the contrast between her
home and that of the Sterns. She compared her own health with Mrs. Stern's
worsening physical condition as a result of multiple sclerosis. She also found the
eating, conversation, and recreation patterns in the Stern’s home seriously wanting in
comparison to her family’s. She complained about the child following the ”frumpy,
old” model set by Mrs. Stern. The child clearly knew, and apparently frequently
heard, that her birth had brought and continues to bring great sadness to her mother.
Janet L. Dolgin, Suffer the Children: Nostalgia, Contradiction and the New Reproductive
Technologies, 28 Ariz. St. L.J. 473, 526-527 (1996), citing Susan Squire, Whatever
Happened to Baby M.?, Redbook, Jan. 1994, at 60.
123

Thus, for example, father’s rights groups highly influence custody and visitation

laws. See e.g., Scott & Derdeyn, supra note 95 at 462. But parents are not the only
adults whose interests influence family politics and laws. Thus, third party visitation
statutes, and particularly statutes awarding grandparents’ visitation, were pushed by
powerful grandparents lobbies. See supra note 40.
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others,124 I do not find that incorporating and protecting adults’ interests in
relation to children is inherently objectionable, but adults’ proprietary
interests in children should be eliminated from current jurisprudence.
The disturbing history of children construed as chattels and as their
parents’ property is well known.125 This perception has definitely been
abandoned at the declaratory level and all—courts, legislators, and legal
scholars—today vehemently reject any such characterization.126 But although
we would like to think that the conception of children as property belongs
only in legal history textbooks, many child advocates have shown that it still
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James G. Dwyer is probably the most vehement current critic of parents' and

other adults' rights in relation to children. See e.g., James G. Dwyer , Parents' Religion
and Children's Welfare: Debunking the Doctrine of Parents' Rights, 82 Calif. L. Rev. 1371
(1994).
125

See e.g. Walter O. Weyrauch et al., Cases and Materials on Family Law: Legal

Concepts and Changing Human Relationships 760 (1994); D. Kelly Weisberg & Susan
Frelich Appleton, Modern Family Law: Cases and Materials 951 (2d ed. 2002); Mary Ann
Mason, From Father’s Property to Children’s Rights: The History of Child Custody in the
United States 46 (1994); Judith T. Younger, Responsible Parents and Good Children, 14
Law & Ineq. 489, 497 (1996); Garrison, supra note 24, at 864.
126

See e.g. Raymond v. Raymond, 345 A.2d 48, 52 (Conn. 1974); In re E.F.V., 461 A.2d

1263, 1268 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983); Commonwealth ex rel. Children’s Aid Soc. v. Gard, 362
Pa. 85, 92-93 (1949); Olinghouse v. Olinghouse, 908 P.2d 280, 286 (Okla. Ct. App. 1995);
Commonwealth ex rel. Robinson v. Ziegler, 35 Pa. D. & C.2d 55, 65 (1964). In fact, the
recurring claim in family law scholarship, family law casebooks, and family law
jurisprudence is that children are no longer perceived as their parents’ property but
as individuals with their own interests, not only at the declaratory level but in
practice as well. Jill Elaine Hasday, The Canon of Family Law, 57 Stan. L. Rev. 825, 848
- 849 (2004). See also Garrison, supra note 24 at 864, 893-894.
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casts its shadow.127 Barbara Bennet Woodhouse, for example, demonstrated
how doctrines of parental rights developed at a time children were still
treated as quasi-property embody and perpetuate this conception.128
When visitation is treated as a parental right, visitation laws show traces
of this view of children that are manifest, above all, in the language of
entitlement that accompanies parental visitation rights, regardless of whether
parents have an established relationship with the child.129 The proprietary
roots of this parental entitlement are further evident in the quid pro quo
approach that accompanies parents’ rights in general and parental visitation
rights in particular.130 The common reasoning whereby the payment of child

127

See e.g. Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, “Who Owns the Child?”: Meyer and Pierce

and the Child as Property, 33 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 995, 1042-1043 (1992); Dwyer, supra
note 124.
128

Woodhouse, supra note 127.

129

See e.g., Dwyer, supra note 7 at 938-939. The apparent consensus in the social

sciences is that, in the absence of a relationship, visitation undesired by the custodial
parent may expose children to the risk of conflicting loyalties. In these circumstances,
arguments about offsetting benefits lack validity. Theoretically, the relationship with
the non-custodial parent may indeed be beneficial to the child, but it is just as likely
that it may not. The question is whether we want to gamble at children’s expense.
Cf. Dwyer, ibid, at 934-935.
130

About the quid pro quo approach that characterizesparenthood and parental

rights, see Katharine T. Bartlett, Re-Expressing Parenthood, 98 Yale L. J. 293, 297-298
(1988).
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support entitles the father to a certain amount of visitation is an expression of
this approach.131
The strength of parents’ visitation rights and the reluctance to deny them,
even if the parents are abusive, as well as the traditional exclusivity of
parental rights regarding visitation, attest to the parents’ proprietary interests
in their children. Exclusive possession and right of use characterize traditional
conceptions of private property. According to this exclusivity rule, then,
children are depicted as property and access to them is a private good to
which only the owners-parents should have access.132 The proprietary roots of
visitation rights as parental rights can also account for the fact that
grandparents have been much more successful than other non-parents in
ensuring recognition to their claims for visitation. Special provisions included
in many state statutes ensure the grandparents’ visitation rights upon the
death of their child, their grandchild’s parent. Grandparents thus inherit from
their child, as it were, right of access to their grandchild.133

131

Nancy Dowd, Fathers and the Supreme Court: Founding Fathers and Nurturing

Fathers, 54 Emory L.J. 1271, 1327 (2005).
132

Woodhouse, supra note 127, at 1113. As I note infra, in section 6, exclusivity may

also serve worthy goals.
133

The grandparents’ easier access as opposed to that of other non-parents could be

explained through their greater political power. The parental propietary interest in
children reflected in visitation conception and laws, however, could also account for
the grandparents’ preferred position. In cases of parental death, some courts have
explicitly recognized the visitation rights of grandparents as “based upon a
‘derivative rights’ theory which permits the grandparents to stand in the shoes of a
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5. Reformulating Visitation—Reformulating Parenthood
A. The Two Faces of Visitation
My survey of visitation jurisprudence reveals two different and conflicting
subtexts in this right. The first emphasizes that underlying this right are
relational values, and visitation is thus meant to secure the continuation of
meaningful relationships between children and adults. The second subtext of
visitation is less overt and seems to embody remnants of the perception of
children as their parents’ property, which usually goes together with an
ideology upholding the nuclear family as a legally superior family model and

deceased parent so that the child is not completely cut-off from one side of the
family.” Preston v. Mercieri, 133 N.H. 36, 42-43 (N.H. 1990). This rationale was more
common before the statutory era of grandparents’ visitation. Elaine D. Ingulli,
Grandparent Visitation Rights: Social Policies and Legal Rights, 87 W. Va. L. Rev. 295, 311
(1985). Most courts currently reject this line of reasoning. See e.g., Verbatim Report
of Proceedings in In re Troxel, No. 93-3-00650-7, at 215 (Wash. Super. Ct., Dec. 14,
1994), cited in Sally F. Goldfarb, Visitation for Nonparents after Troxel v. Granville:
Where should States Draw the Line?, 32 Rutgers L. J. 783, 817 n.196 (2001). Generally, it
is used to support the more limited extent of visitation rights awarded to
grandparents as compared to parents, or to protect the grandparents’ visitation
rights following the grandchild’s adoption by a stepparent. When courts adhere to a
derivative rights theory of grandparents’ visitation rights, an adoption that
terminates the rights of the biological parent is generally also held to end the status
of the grandparents upon which the right to visitation rests, thereby divesting the
grandparent of visitation privileges. Denying this theory enables courts to continue
grandparents’ visitation despite the adoption. See e.g., Preston, 133 N.H. at 43.
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marriage as a sacred institution. The co-existence of these two subtexts of
visitation thwarts the development of a coherent theory of visitation.
Endorsing the relational understanding of visitation requires that the
right to visitation be detached from the cluster of rights associated with legal
parenthood and be constructed as a separate relational right. Such a step
would convey that our society values and rewards nurture and care for
children, making the interest of children in the continuity of relationships a
central consideration of visitation laws.
On this point, however, my criticism may be misplaced. Parenthood
could be merely a proxy for the values of preserving continuity of
relationships and attachments in children’s lives. Parents and children, it is
assumed, generally share intimacy as well as strong attachments. Thus,
insofar as visitation laws aim to secure children’s attachments, parenthood
could indeed be a useful and valuable proxy, especially given the justified
reluctance to grant judges discretion to inquire into the quality and strength
of particular attachments. Since the use of proxies is based on
generalizations, it can be expected to be both over and under-inclusive. This
is an inevitable cost of the reliance on proxies, which may seem acceptable in
light of their benefits. Furthermore, the recognition of non-parents visitation
rights in statutes and in case law has rectified the under-inclusiveness of
parenthood as a proxy for meaningful relationships in children’s lives.
My argument, however, states that parenthood is an inadequate proxy for
the values that should underlie visitation rights, and that extending visitation
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to non-parents based on a conception of visitation as a parental right is
flawed. Historically, parenthood may have been considered a good enough
proxy for the nurture and care of children as well as for the creation of
significant attachments in a child’s life. Although there are reasons to doubt
whether this was indeed so, I do not address this question. In today’s reality,
however, many legal parents do not care for their children, while an evergrowing number of children are nurtured and cared for by non-parents.
Moreover, given the current malleability of legal parenthood, it cannot
function as a good enough proxy for strong and meaningful relationship in
children’s lives.

B. Reconceptualizing Parental Rights
Detaching visitation from the cluster of rights associated with parenthood will
transform not only the right to visitation but legal parenthood per se, and will
contribute to the ongoing endeavor of liberating legal parenthood from its
proprietary remnants. Reshaping legal parenthood so as to eliminate the
disgraceful notion of children as property is a long-term project that has been
proceeding for over a century.134 Parenthood is an activity as well as a certain
stance vis-à-vis a child. As an activity, parenthood means caring for,
educating, assuming responsibility for, and playing a supervisory role in a
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See e.g., Mason, supra note 125. In this respect, this paper joins a series of articles

published over the last two decades, each proposing a specific reform of legal
parenthood. See e.g., Bartlett, supra note 130; Woodhouse, supra note 20.
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child’s life. As a stance, parenthood emphasizes mainly biological, genetic, or
formal legal ties. I argue that the caretaking activity should take priority in
shaping legal doctrines of parental rights, thus contributing to the eradication
of parenthood’s proprietary legacy.135
An examination of the rights accorded to parents will reveal that all the
rights and entitlements that accompany parental status are associated with
the raising of children, except for visitation, which is the only parental right
that is not dependent on any prior care for the child. 136 Detaching the right to
visitation from the cluster of rights associated with legal parenthood,
therefore, strengthens the connection between parental rights and parents
assuming responsibility for their children. The stronger the connection
between parental rights and child rearing, the greater the justification of these
rights and the greater the chances of formulating a better definition of legal
parenthood.137

135

Cf. Woodhouse, supra note 20.

136

Woodhouse, however, argues that even parental rights associated with child

rearing reflect this notion of children because they were developed at a time children
were still treated as quasi- property. Woodhouse, supra note 127.
137

Although my argument calls for strengthening the connection between parental

rights and the activity of parenthood, it does not advocate changing the definition of
legal parenthood to one determined on a functional basis. Legal parenthood could
indeed be reformed by changing its very definition rather than merely by detaching
visitation rights from the bundle of rights associated with this status. Thus, for
instance, legal parenthood can be defined functionally, focusing on parenting activity
rather than on biology and genetics, or it can be defined from the children’s
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The proposition that parental rights are connected to the activity of child
rearing has received some support in Supreme Court cases, most notably the
unwed fathers cases noted above,138 and also in other courts’ case law.139

perspective. See e.g., Woodouse, supra note 135. In this new definition, detaching
visitation from parental rights would become redundant. With legal parenthood
centered around parenthood as the activity of caring for and assuming responsibility
for children, relational values would be injected into the rights of visitation as a
parental right, as they would into all other rights that flow from parental status.
Visitation could thus remain a parental right and still express relational values, since
parenthood itself would embody such values. Despite my recognition that legal
parenthood should undergo extensive changes, mainly to fit the changing reality of
American families, I argue that adopting a purely functional or child-centered
approach to define legal parenthood gives judges too much discretion in allocating
parental rights, outweighing the supposed benefit of ensuring better expression to
legal parenthood. Resistance to broad judicial discretion to inquire into the function
of particular relationships and determine whether they establish parenthood and
prevail over biology, genetics, and the like, seems amply justified. In particular,
groups suffering from discrimination have good reasons to distrust the discretion of
the judiciary, which is dominated by white middle-upper class men. In the context
of parental rights, Painter v. Bannister, 258 Iowa 1390, 140 N.W.2d 152, cert. denied,
385 U.S. 949 (1966) is frequently cited as an instance of these dangers. In Painter, the
“bohemian” lifestyle of the biological father constituted grounds for the court’s
decision to award permanent custody of a child to his grandparents, whose lifestyle
was “conventional.” Painter was a custody rather than a parenthood determination
case. The court’s disregard of the inherent legal presumption in the father’s favor,
however, was based on its view of the grandparents as psychological parents and of
the grandfather as a “father figure,” as adduced in a psychological testimony. The
decision regarding custody was thus premised on a priori view about the
grandparents’ parental status.
138

See e.g., Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 261 (U.S. 1983).
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Eliminating the remnants of the “child as property” conception in the
definition of legal parenthood thus requires that, as far as possible, parental
legal entitlements be made dependent on parents assuming daily
responsibility for the children’s upbringing.140

C. Without Unbundling Parenthood
My proposal, though it may appear so at first glance, is not a call for
unbundling the cluster of parental rights. Unbundling legal categories into the
respective claim-rights, privileges, powers, and immunities that comprise
them was a project that occupied various legal theorists, particularly
following Hohfeld’s work.141 Private property was probably the central target

139

See e.g., Garska v. McCoy, 167 W. Va. 59 (W. Va. 1981).

140

Scholars such as James G. Dwyer would probably argue that parents should

have no Hohfeldian rights whatsoever, whether or not related to their child rearing
activity. See e.g. Dwyer, supra note 124. Eliminating parental rights and entitlements
altogether may appear at first glance as the best way of eradicating propietary
remnants from legal parenthood. But the practical effect of parents’ rights, and
particularly parents’ rights to raise their children as they see fit, is to raise the
threshold for state involvement in child rearing decisions and in children’s daily
lives. Denying these rights would actually increase state involvement in child
rearing, to the children’s detriment. See e.g., Stephen G. Gilles, Hey, Christians, Leave
Your Kids Alone!, 16 Const Commen 149 (1999).
141

Wesley N. Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions (Walter Wheeler Cook ed.,

1923).
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of such a project.142 The “unbundling of property” theorists wished to
emphasize—what today seems obvious—that property is a human artifact
rather than a natural institution.143 As such, property is not an inevitable
bundle of entitlements and, therefore, legal disputes cannot be resolved
simply by reference to the institution of property through application of
internal deductive reasoning. According to this line of reasoning, each
element in the bundle of entitlements called property—that is, each claimright, privilege, immunity, and so forth—must be justified separately in the
specific context where it arises.144
My proposal regarding visitation rights has some similarities with the
project of “unbundling property.” It also emphasizes the artificiality of legal
parenthood, which is an artificial rather than a natural (or even a “God
given”) status.145 Hence, I reject the idea that legal decisions can be made

142

For a description of this analysis of property see Jeremy Waldron The Right to

Private Property 27-30 (1988).
143

Locke, for example, attempted to show that property rights could arise in the

“state of nature” apart from government and positive law. For an explication of
Locke’s theory of property, see e.g., Waldron, ibid, at 137 – 251; Wendy J. Gordon, A
Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law of
Intellectual Property, 102 Yale L.J. 1533, 1540-1572 (1993).
144

Jeremy Waldron, Introduction to Theories of Rights 1, 10-11 (Jeremy Waldron ed.

1984); Hanoch Dagan, The Craft of Property, 91 Calif. L. Rev. 1517, 1533 (2003).
145

Whereas property is now obviously regarded as a created institution, the

perception of parenthood and parental rights as a human creation it not as solid.
See e.g. Bartlett, supra note 3, at 887 – 890; Frances E. Olsen, The Myth of State
Intervention in the Family, 18 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 835, 845-848 (1985); Smith v.
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through internal deduction from the concept of parent.146 I also call for a
critical examination of the specific claim-rights, immunities, powers, and
duties that comprise parental status, and specifically challenge the right of
visitation that parental status entails. Nonetheless, although I seek to detach
the right to visitation from the cluster of rights associated with parenthood, I
do not call for unbundling legal parenthood altogether.
Legal institutions, categories, or statuses such as parenthood, however
artificial and fictitious they may be, perform an important role in conveying
the notions and ideals intended by the law.147 They express, support, and

Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 845 (1977); Moore v.
City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)); Behn v. Timmons, 345 So. 2d 388, 389 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1977); In re J.P., 648 P.2d 1364, 1373 (Utah 1982).
146

I do not suggest that this approach presents a naturalistic fallacy, moving from

“is” (the fact of being a parent) to “ought” (the judgment that a parent has a special
right to visitation). Since parenthood is a moral term, this “fact” itself is not devoid
of moral import, and moving from “is” to “ought” thus poses no problem. Cf. A. I.
Melden, Rights and Right Conduct (1959) (discussing the right of a parent to “special
consideration” from his children and suggesting this right is related to the moral fact
of parenthood). But recognizing a moral relation such as parenthood and making a
judgment about what is due to a person by other individuals are two separate issues.
Philippa Foot, Book Review, 70 The Philosophical Review 260, 261 (1961) (Reviewing
A. I. Melden, Rights and Right Conduct (1959)).
147

As widely recognized, the law can convey ideas and ideals through its

categories, statuses, and rules. On the expressive role of law, see e.g., Cass R.
Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2021 (1996). This view
usually encompasses two related accounts. The first concerns the symbolic aspect of
law, and the second concerns the law’s ability to direct and affect human behavior
See e.g. Lewis A. Kornhauser, No Best Answer?, 146 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1599, 1636 (1998);
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enhance social goods and ideals.148 Whether we think of the expressive role of
law in terms of its concrete social effect or merely in its symbolic meaning, the
law needs to convey its messages and ideals in ways visible to the individuals
in the society. Since it is unlikely that individuals will know the particular
details of specific legal obligations or entitlements, what is visible to them are
the more fundamental and familiar legal concepts.149 Parenthood as a popular
symbol, then, may achieve desired social effects by leading to the
internalization of ideals of intimacy, care, and responsibility toward children

Carl E. Schneider, Marriage, Morals, and the Law: No-Fault Divorce and Moral Discourse,
1994 Utah L. Rev. 503, 567-568. The second and more consequentialist account is
debatable, since much still remains puzzling in the interaction between law and
human behavior. See e.g., Neil MacCormick, On Legal Decisions and Their
Consequences: From Dewey to Dworkin, 58 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 239, 251-255 (1983); Robert C.
Ellickson, Order Without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes 144-145 (1991). This is
particularly true in the realm of family life and intimate relations, where ideology,
emotions, and other powerful extra-legal forces affect human behavior. See e.g.
Fineman, supra note 113, at 14-34. Nonetheless, the expressive function of law is not
limited to its social effects, which are somewhat speculative. On the grounds for
endorsing the expressive function of law other than its potential social effects, see
Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State 62 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 1, 69-70 (1995). For my current purposes, I adopt a modest version whereby,
whatever the admittedly unknown influence of legal rights, they should direct in the
direction that is normatively desirable. Dagan, supra note 144, at 1561 n. 218
148

For this argument regarding property, see Dagan, supra note 144. For the

specific expressive role of marital property see also Carolyn J. Frantz & Hanoch
Dagan, Properties of Marriage, 104 Colum. L. Rev. 75, 97-98 (2004).
149

Hanoch Dagan, Correspondence: Just Compensation, Incentives, and Social Meanings,

99 Mich. L. Rev. 134, 149 – 150 (2000).
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in ways impossible to attain through the legal details and elements that
construct this status. Dissolving parenthood, therefore, hinders its crucial
expressive function. When parenthood is perceived as just a bundle of duties,
obligations, privileges, claim-rights, powers, and immunities, it loses its
powerful connotations. Parenthood has historically implied a dominating and
patriarchal status expressing proprietary interests in children, whose traces
are still evident today.150 And yet, maintaining parental status as a legal
category is still worthwhile because, as a fragmented bundle of obligations
and entitlements, it is unlikely to convey any message at all—neither one of
proprietary interest in children, nor one of commitment, responsibility, and
care. If parenthood is to perform any expressive role, desirable or not, it
cannot become a mere “laundry list” of independent duties, obligations,
claim-rights, immunities, and powers, with an infinite number of potential
combinations for bundling them together.151 A certain measure of stability is
also required for the law to have any effective influence,152 which is
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Supra note 125 and accompanying text.
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For the theorists’ claim on the “unbundling of property,” see Dagan, supra note

144, at 1534.
152

Dagan, ibid, at 1562-1563. But deconstructing legal concepts and addressing

each element separately also sends a false message concerning the expressive role of
law The specific bundle of obligations and entitlements is not a random event
lacking any integrity; rather, a normative ideal unifies the various obligations and
entitlements, and this ideal is what the law attempts to express. Id. The legal
concepts, statuses, and categories, then, represent the ideals that unify the different
obligations and entitlements.
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unattainable when the status of parenthood is unbundled and its various
constituent elements are capable of regroupment in numberless ways. My
argument that the right to visitation should not be thought of as a parental
right, then, is not meant to unbundle legal parenthood altogether but to claim
that the right of visitation is unfit for inclusion in the cluster of elements
comprising parental status.
Detaching visitation from parental status would not signal the onset of a
process of disintegrating parenthood. The difference between visitation and
other parental rights has two aspects. First, as noted, all the rights and
entitlements that accompany parental status, except for visitation, are
associated with the activity of raising and taking care of children. Visitation is
the only right that neither accompanies child rearing nor depends upon prior
caring for a child. A second point is related to the justification and the role of
parental rights. Conventional wisdom justifies parental rights as a shield
against state involvement in everyday child rearing decisions. According to
this argument, debates about parental rights boil down to one issue: parental
vs. government authority over child rearing – which one do we fear less?153
The reasoning in this case is that of a zero-sum game: abolishing parents’
rights means more power to the state to make day-to-day decisions on child

153

The issue is not parents’ rights versus children’s rights, for even if our

paramount concern is the best interest of children we should decide who is more
competent to determine what would serve it best: the parents or the courts. Supra
note 140.
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rearing, whereas preserving the rights of parents means less power to the
state. Here again, this analysis applies to most parental rights except for the
right of visitation. Awarding visitation rights becomes the state’s “admission
ticket” to involvement in the day-to-day rearing of children. The issue at stake
is not only the decision about who will be allowed to associate with children,
but the state’s intervention in decisions concerning the child’s upbringing
when a holder of visitation rights requests state involvement in order to
protect these rights.154

6. The Role of Parental Exclusivity
My recognition of the significant role of parental status is also at the heart
of my argument concerning the significance of this status' exclusivity. As
long as visitation is understood as a parental right, recognizing non-parents’
visitation rights challenges the idea of parenthood as an exclusive status, a
principle that should not be easily abandoned. By contrast, if visitation is

154

Thus, for example, non-custodial parents may, in order to preserve their

visitation rights, interfere with some of the custodian’s decisions concerning the child
and the custodian’s place of residence. This enables non-custodial parents to affect
the financial opportunities of the custodial parent and the child, the familial and
social support available to them, and many other important aspects of their lives.
See e.g., Ramirez-Barker v. Barker, 418 S.E.2d 675 (N.C. Ct. App. 1992); In re Marriage of
Sheley, 895 P.2d 850 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995); In re Marriage of Eckert, 518 N.E2d 1041
(Ill. 1988) (denying the custodial mother’s request to move). .
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understood as an independent relational right detached from parental status,
the visitation rights of non-parents can be recognized while preserving the
principle of parental exclusivity.
The exclusivity of parental status, stating that only a child’s legal parents
have rights and duties considered parental and non-parents cannot acquire
them, has been a well-established principle in American legal tradition.155
Parental exclusivity is mainly evident in the idea that the child’s parents
rather than the state or other individuals make decisions concerning the
children’s upbringing. Various scholars have criticized the idea of parental
exclusivity and the notion that only parents can have rights, duties, and
obligations with respect to children.156 Their critique was largely triggered by
the changes in family structure and the law’s failure to respond to them. Since
legal definitions of parenthood appeared inadequate and unable to reflect the
current reality of parenthood, arguments were raised in support of enabling
individuals who are not legally recognized as parents to acquire parental
rights as non-parents. The issue of contact between children and nonparenting adults involved in their lives was one of the prime settings
highlighting the inadequacy of parenthood as an exclusive status.157
Though I agree that contact between children and non-parents may at
times be accorded legal recognition and protection, challenging parental
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Bartlett, supra note 3, at 883-889.
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See e.g., Bartlett, ibid; Young, supra note 27; Kavanagh, supra note 27.
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See e.g. Bartlett,ibid; Garrison, supra note 83.

71

Rethinking Visitation

exclusivity is the wrong course for addressing this issue. Critics of parental
exclusivity fail to recognize the value and the role of this idea. Exclusivity is
part of what defines legal parenthood; parents have a unique relationship
with their children. Undermining parental exclusivity thus erodes the very
meaning of legal parenthood. Diluting the parents’ unique status may lower
the threshold for non-parents to supersede the judgment and decisions of fit
parents through state intervention giving standing and rights to other
individuals to make claims concerning a child. It may even ease the removal
of children from their parents by non-parents, without necessarily meeting a
high standard such as parental unfitness.
Few, I believe, support easy removal of children or the substitution of fit
parents’ judgment. On the issue of visitation, the call for recognizing not only
the parents’ rights but also those of others has gained some support, but an
argument that non-parents (be it grandparents, parents’ partners, or other
relatives) should have rights to make decisions regarding children’s lives is,
barring rare circumstances, much more objectionable. Most adhere to the
parents’ exclusive role as decision-makers and caregivers for their children.158
But relinquishing parental exclusivity to allow for visitations undermines
the very idea of exclusivity, and explaining why visitation should be
recognized as the sole exception to parental exclusivity becomes hard. If nonparents can gain some rights considered parental, why not allow them all
158

Young, for example, recognizes the need to preserve core authority, though she

does not recognize it as parental authority. Young, supra note 27.
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parental rights? Indeed, Katharine Bartlett, the scholar most closely associated
with the idea that parenthood should not be an exclusive status, applied her
argument not only to visitation rights but to all parental rights, duties, and
obligations, including custody.159 Notions such as de facto parentage blur the
line between parents and non-parents since they are used to confer rights
considered parental upon those who are not legally recognized as parents. Yet
these notions are also not limited to conferring rights of visitation and enable
recognition of non-parents’ custody rights.160
On these grounds, Bartlett and other scholars who advocate nonexclusive parenthood have been criticized for diluting the legal significance of
parenthood. Parents from marginalized groups such as the poor, or gays and
lesbians, have particular cause for concern from this possible detraction and
even severance of their parental status.161
What would be the best strategy for addressing the problem of contact
between children and non-parental adults who are part of their lives while
also preserving the uniqueness of parental status? The answer to this question

159

Bartlett, supra note 3.
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See e.g., Clark v. Wade, 544 S.E.2d 99, 106 (Ga. 2001); Painter v. Bannister 258 Iowa

1390, 140 N.W.2d 152, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 949 (1966).
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Painter again serves as a good example. See supra note 137. In the the context

of gay and lesbian parents this fear was expressed, e.g., by Nancy D. Polikoff, This
Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood to Meet the Needs of Children in
Lesbian-Mother and Other Nontraditional Families, 78 Geo. L. J. 459, 473 (1990); Sears,
supra note 62, at 573-574.
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reveals a further advantage of the right to visitation as formulated in my
analysis. According to my view, visitation is an independent right resting on
relational values above all, so that both parents and non-parents can make a
claim for visitation based on an existing meaningful relationship with a child.
My understanding of parental rights encompasses only those rights that are
an adjunct to the rearing and caring for children. Decision making and
caretaking rights are thus exclusive to parents. My proposal would enable
recognition of non-parents’ visitation rights while maintaining parenthood as
an exclusive status and preserving the parents’ unique authority.162
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My proposal is thus also a partial solution to the dilemma faced by lesbian and

gay parents, as it was presented by Nancy Polikoff. On the one hand, lesbian and
gay parents seek to strengthen the uniqueness and exclusivity of parental status to
combat threats from homophobic relatives claiming to raise their children (who
should not, according to them, be raised by gay parents), or otherwise try to interfere
in the children’s upbringing. Nancy D. Polikoff, The Impact of Troxel v. Granville on
Lesbian and Gay Parents, 32 Rutgers L. J. 825, 825-827 (2001). On the other hand, in a
growing number of cases, a lesbian legally recognized mother has used her exclusive
legal status to severe the child’s relationship with her ex-partner, who was not
legally recognized as a parent. Parental exclusivity may therefore foreclose the
claims of legally unrecognized lesbian and gay parents. Ibid. Above all, a solution is
obviously called for to enable recognition of parenthood in same-sex families. This,
however, is not the subject of this article. Until legal definitions of parenthood adapt
to parenthood in same-sex families, my understanding of the right to visitation and
of parental right enables advocates of lesbian and gay parents to maintain parental
exclusivity and safeguard their parental status against homophobic relatives. At the
same time, it also enables legally unrecognized parents to claim at least visitation
rights with children. Though this solution is not ideal, it enables to preserve two
ostensibly contradictory claims.
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7. Conclusion
Understanding the right to visitation as an independent right based on
relational interests of nurture and care does not answer many difficult
questions that occupy both lawmakers and legal scholars. Crucially, since
talking about relational values does not mean that any relationship should be
the basis for a claim of visitation rights, this approach does not explain what
relationships should give rise to such a claim. Furthermore, it does not
explain how to reconcile the authority of the custodial parent making child
rearing decisions with the recognition of others’ visitation rights, whether
parents or non-parents. These and other issues remain open for future
discussion.
My proposal is not intended to foreclose the debate on visitation rights
but to break new ground. The reading of visitation rights outlined here
enables to redirect visitation laws toward a legal model based on the
relational interests of both children and adults, making visitation rules
coherent at the level of principle and pursuing questions pertaining to adults’
relationship with children within an adequate conceptual framework. In this
respect, approaching these difficult dilemmas outside the parental status
scheme and focusing on relational values is invariably better than the current
status-based rules that seem to ignore the interests and needs of all the parties
involved.
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Once visitation is understood as an independent right rather than part of
the parental status cluster, the remaining challenge is to transcend the slogan
that it should flow from relationships and translate it into concrete rules. A
detailed proposal for new rules of visitation as they seem to emerge from my
analysis of visitation rights exceeds the scope of this paper, but I will offer
some broad guidelines toward such an undertaking.
The first reform concerns the primary question that should be asked in
visitation litigation, namely, whether or not the claimant has an existing
relationship with the child. A distinction should be drawn, then, between
claims to maintain an already existing relationship and claims to create a
relationship that does not yet exist. The longer and more intense the
relationship between the child and the claimant, the stronger should be the
legal presumption that terminating the relationship would be harmful to the
child. Indeed, to avoid subjective judicial assessment of the quality of the
relationship between the child and the claimant (an inquiry potentially
suspected as prejudiced and probably necessitating “experts”), legal rules
should rely on objective criteria such as the duration and intensity of the
relationships as proxy for their quality. Biology, genetics, marital status, or a
relationship with the child’s parents should not be utterly ignored, but they
should have only a secondary or supplementary role in visitation legal rules
and decision-making.
This understanding of visitation rights will probably not entail vital
practical changes in the legal outcomes of visitation disputes. But although
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most legal parents would still be entitled to visitation rights and many nonparents would not, my analysis would entail changes in some cases that, even
if minor, are still relevant. The more significant element concerns the reasons
and justifications for awarding or denying such rights. Since these would be
crucially different, they would constitute a change in the results because two
radically different frameworks of analysis cannot reach the “same” result.”163
The way of expressing visitation rights and the reasons adduced for denying
them or recognizing them, therefore, are no less important than the end result.
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